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This thesis argues that contemporary apologetic approaches correlate to, or derive their methods 
from, different anthropological models with various degrees of accuracy, and that an 
interdisciplinary study of humanity leads to proper conclusions for apologetic method. Three of 
the most utilized contemporary apologetic methods are Traditional Apologetics, 
Presuppositionalism, and Experiential/Narratival Apologetics. Each method reflects an 
assumption of human persons as thinkers, believers, or desirers, respectively. Interdisciplinary 
research from theology, sociology, psychology, economics, and neuroscience corroborates the 
anthropological assumption of humans as essentially desirers. This research leads to at least 
three important implications for apologetic method, including a focus on persuasion over 
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The Why: Derek’s Story 
My younger brother Derek and I were always close. While many siblings foster resentment 
towards each other, our difficult lives only brought us closer over the years. After I left for 
college to study ministry, I was astonished to find out that Derek denounced his faith, claiming it 
as illogical, unsubstantiated, and misguided. He was appalled at the church and found Christians 
to be irrational. After finding a home in science and atheism, he would frequently argue his 
convictions with our mother since I was away. Although she is a strong Christian, she was 
unconcerned with logical arguments in defending her faith. She just knew it to be true. She held a 
“simple” faith.1 Unsurprisingly, especially given his personality and background, this was not 
enough for him. Derek’s search for meaning and truth forbid an uncritical acceptance of such 
beliefs. So, Derek and I began to dialogue.  
Through shared contemplation of philosophical and theological topics, I presented 
arguments for theism and subsequently Christianity. Derek called me his “sparring partner”; 
which I became quite fond of. After over a year and a half of dialogue, as Derek and I sat on his 
bedroom floor passing around a mini football, he finally conceded: not only is God real, but 
Christianity makes the most sense. Immediately, my heart was filled with joy – at least until his 
 
1 Although the term “simple” is often used derogatorily, it was included as that would likely be the intention of 
Derek at the time. My firm belief is that one’s faith is not less for lack of logical arguments to defend it. I would 
point to Alvin Plantinga’s view of God as a properly basic belief which upholds and reinforces this assertion. See 




next words: “But, I still do not want to be a Christian.” Shocked, I desperately tried to reconcile 
his statements in my head. I had no idea what to do next. 
So, I decided to share my testimony. The story of how my past trauma and depression led to 
a suicide attempt. How as I stood there about to end my life, I whispered desperate last words 
with tear-filled eyes: “God, if there is more to this life, please stop me.” In what was likely the 
luckiest “coincidence” of my life, someone found me, and I was stopped. Although this 
experience did not provide the panacea for all my issues, and even though the subsequent 
journey was quite arduous, that day I gave my life to sharing the light that I had found and caring 
for people in the midst of darkness. Instantly, Derek wept. Unfamiliar with the nuances of my 
story, Derek was startled and saddened. Yet familiar with mental health and life struggles, 
suddenly the abstract dialogue was thoroughly relevant and practical; his story made sense 
within the grand story of Christianity. In the overwhelming haze that tends to follow a change of 
heart, he pondered the future of his story: what is he to do now? After we prayed that day, and 
after a seemingly endless amount of philosophy and theology discussions over the past few 
years, Derek looks back on his past with curiosity. He can draw connections between his 
unbelief and specific life factors, such as his lack of community and painful past. While his 
journey, like mine, is still characteristically marked by intellectual curiosity and skepticism, his 
testimony is worthy of reflection. 
This thesis aims to make sense of Derek’s testimony, along with countless others, where 
reason, evidences, and arguments were not enough when it came to conversion or even a sincere 
exploration of Christianity – even for a person with the proclivities and personality such as his. 
Diverse means led up to Derek’s change of heart: friendly dialogue with a trusted partner, 




coherency of a system, relevancy to life, and especially the drawing of God. Once Derek 
conceded intellectual defeat, some would argue there was cause for celebration: not only were 
his arguments destroyed, but he admitted Christianity is the most rational option – the faith has 
been defended! For many apologists, this presentation of rational arguments and evidences for 
the Christian faith is where apologetics begins and ends – as this encapsulates the defense of the 
faith.2 However, perhaps apologetics is (or should be) more than this. 
Over the years, I came to realize that I was shaped by a particular model that affected my 
method for apologetics and my beliefs about Derek. I had a certain idea of the sort of creature 
humans are and why they believe and act the way they do. This formed the way I defended the 
faith and engaged with Derek. This correlation is exactly the type of question apologists should 
pose about their method: what kind of person does this method presuppose, and what kind does it 
nurture?3 It is likely many apologists fail to uncover the type of person their method assumes, if 
not advances, and critically reflect on the consequences of such a person. This is to the detriment 
of the faith and apologetics, I believe, as there is reason to be concerned about the prevailing 
anthropological models in light of current research.4  
James K.A. Smith describes three of the prevalent possibilities in theological and 
philosophical anthropology.5 The first defines the human person as thinker. This is a “rationalist” 
 
2 The next chapter’s discussion on traditional apologetic methodology explores this general approach and the 
variation within it. 
3 Richard Sennett poses this exact question about the psychological effects of capitalism on human persons. See 
Richard Sennett, The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 2011); quoted in Rowan Williams, Being Human: Bodies, Minds, Persons (Grand Rapids: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2018), 84.  
4 This research is the topic of the third chapter.  
5 James K.A. Smith, Desiring the Kingdom: Worship, Worldview, and Cultural Formation (Grand Rapids: Baker 




or “intellectualist” portrait with emphasis on cognitive faculties and an optimism towards reason, 
often paired with functional disembodiment. The person-as-thinker model especially prevailed 
throughout modernity, and currently is adapted by much of Protestant Christianity.6 The second 
defines the human person as believer. As a critique to the former, the person-as-believer model 
views humans primarily through their pre-rational beliefs, since thinking is dependent upon 
one’s worldview, the “commitments and trusts that orient our being-in-the-world”; this model is 
portrayed in Reformed Christianity.7 The third defines the human person as desirer or lover. This 
model discounts the former two as reductionistic, and instead passes on a more holistic 
anthropology developed from Augustine. In the person-as-desirer model, humans intend the 
world through their unconscious desire and love; the telos of this desire orients their path in the 
world and is affected primarily through bodily, narrative, affective, and relational ways. Smith 
finds this model to be the most promising. Each of these models reflect the assumptions of a 
different apologetic approach, as will be explored later.  
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the type of human person apologetic methodologies 
presuppose to glean insight for apologetic method through comparison to current anthropological 
research. Due to the size of such a task, the scope of this project will be limited in a few ways. 
First, the apologetic approaches that are analyzed will be limited to frequently utilized 
contemporary methods on the basis of relevance and focus. This will omit from consideration 
apologetic approaches that are solely historic, hold too few adherents, lack a specific or 
 
6 Protestant Christianity’s emphasis on ideas, abstract values, propositional knowledge and revelation, and an 
“overly intellectualist” view of salvation are great examples of this. See David W. Bebbington, “Evangelical 
Christianity and Modernism”, Crux 26, no. 2 (1990): 1–9; Alister McGrath, Narrative Apologetics: Sharing the 
Relevance, Joy, and Wonder of the Christian Faith (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2019), 12–15; and Smith, Desiring 
the Kingdom, 42.  




actionable method, or apologetic tools or mediums that are not an established system — 
regardless of how insightful they may be. Second, the anthropological research covered will be 
limited to theology, neuroscience, and the social sciences, specifically sociology, psychology, 
and economics. This range allows for a diverse array of voices to comment on anthropological 
issues and corroborate each other where applicable. Third, the final reflections derived from the 
anthropological research will be limited to a few key insights that lack development in the 
already analyzed methods. In other words, since an apologetic method that assumes an 
“accurate” anthropology will have already been analyzed, the reflections on a properly informed 
apologetic method will not reiterate all that was already said, but instead develop the approach 
further from important research implications. 
 
The How: Structure and Flow of the Argument 
Chapter two begins with an exploration of various taxonomies of contemporary apologetic 
approaches in order to better illustrate the current climate of apologetics. This results in around 
fifteen apologetic approaches for consideration. After a brief examination of them all, the 
approaches are limited according to the scope of the thesis above, resulting in four criteria for 
further examination: (1) current utilization in contemporary settings; (2) inclusion of one or 
many specific or actionable methodologies; (3) support from several notable proponents or 
adherents, and (4) must be a standalone method or system, not a tool or medium. The remaining 
approaches are further condensed into wider categories based on similar strategies or structures if 
applicable. Each of these categories are then explored and examined through their methodology 
and anthropological underpinnings. A summary of the methods’ anthropological models and 




Chapter three explores the interdisciplinary anthropological research. The first section 
examines theological anthropology through three main lenses: (1) the early Genesis narratives, 
(2) Christology, and (3) Pauline literature. The second section contains research from the 
sciences, including psychology, sociology, economics, and neuroscience. Finally, the conclusion 
will summarize the main anthropological insights of the interdisciplinary research, compare the 
results to Smith’s three models, and end with three significant implications for apologetic 
method that were not already developed.  
Chapter four translates the three apologetic implications from the previous chapter into three 
dichotomies for apologetic reflection: persuasion over argumentation, creativity over rigidity, 
and community over individuality. Each of these are unpacked and developed with the insight 
derived from the anthropological research. The first section explores nine modes of persuasion 
for the apologist to engage: (1) logos, persuasion by means of logic and coherency; (2) ethos, 
persuasion by means of character and authority; (3) pathos, persuasion by means of emotions 
and values; (4) kairos, persuasion by means of timing and appropriateness; (5) mythos, 
persuasion by means of narrative and testimony; (6) topos, persuasion by means of theme and 
relevance; (7) tropos, persuasion by means of way and manner; (8) typos, persuasion by means 
of imitation and embodiment; and (9) theos, persuasion by means of the Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit. The second section on creativity discusses the plurality of ways to engage the apologetic 
task. The third section emphasizes community and collaboration in apologetics. Finally, the 
conclusion will consist of a summary of a properly informed apologetic methodology according 




CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO APOLOGETIC METHOD 
 
Introduction 
Apologetics is like a beautifully aged tree. Ancient sundry roots blossom into majestic scenery, 
producing various colors, patterns, and fruit, transforming with the season. Over the centuries, 
apologists – with variegated foci and presuppositions – produced a range of colorful and fruitful 
approaches. Although, when the seasons change, some methods and approaches become vacuous 
and arid, irrelevant and obsolete. While God remains constant, apologetic methodology 
constantly requires pruning; the dying branches must be cut-off for new growth.1 For continual 
life and beauty, the tree – like apologetics – must be reshaped and guided to continue in the new 
seasons or tough terrain. When the cultural climate changes, such as in the Enlightenment of the 
18th Century, so, too, must the apologists and their methods change for influence and survival; 
lack of adaptability and progression stymies growth.2 Although the historic roots of apologetics 
and their foci perpetually recede and revive, the apologist’s challenge is to defend the faith in 
their context.3 As the apologist abides in God, and God abides in the apologist, he/she will bear 
 
1 Braxton Hunter, Evangelistic Apologetics: Compatibility and Integration (Evansville: Trinity Academic Press, 
2014), 100. 
2 As Christianity was devastated by the attacks of the Enlightenment, several apologists — with very different 
approaches — responded to the call. See John Warwick Montgomery, “A Short History of Apologetics,” in 
Christian Apologetics: An Anthology of Primary Sources, eds. Khaldoun A. Sweis and Chad V. Meister (Grand 
Rapids: Zondervan, 2012), 24–25. 
3 In tracing the history and development of apologetics, this oscillation is made evident. Aristotelian proofs and 
literary apologetics from the medieval period, for example, still influence many apologists today. Conversely, many 
early apologetic emphases, such as miracles, are not as influential today. Apologetic methods ebb and flow in usage 




fruit (cf. Jn. 15:5-6); similarly, the vitality of apologetic methodology also depends on this 
mutual remaining. Thus, apologetics is simultaneously person-centered and God-centered. The 
question remains: how, then, may the faith be defended today?  
The spectrum of contemporary approaches offers a wide array of answers. Before 
proposing a new or revised approach towards apologetics, an analysis and selection of the 
prevalent contemporary apologetic methodologies is required. Identifying and assessing an 
extensive list of apologetic methods and approaches is quite the daunting, if not impossible, task. 
Why even are there so many different apologetic methods? If defense of the faith is a biblical 
command, why do not all apologists simply follow the scriptural example? Despite reading the 
same text, many intelligent and faithful Christians end up with different conclusions. As will be 
explored later, this is likely due to their beliefs about humanity. These anthropological 
assumptions inevitably affect their methodology and aims; thus, the selected apologetic methods 
will be analyzed along these lines. The rest of this chapter aims to explore the spectrum of 
contemporary approaches to apologetic methodology and further examine the selected methods’ 
anthropological foundations. 
 
The Extremes & the Middle Path(s): A Spectrum of Views 
This section will survey various apologetic methods and categorizations to determine which 
views will be selected for further in-depth analysis. Since many contemporary apologetic method 
taxonomies have been offered in recent history, they will be compared alongside each other to 
present a more complete picture of the current apologetic climate. Perspectives with similar 




designated for further examination based on their contemporary relevance and viability as a 
distinct system and methodology. 
Brian Morley undertook a similar objective to classify and categorize apologetic 
methods, and created a beneficial, yet incomplete, chart of apologetic approaches.4 The 
following page contains a condensed visual graphic of this spectrum with a brief summary of 
each perspective (fig 1). Although these views will be elaborated on later, they provide a 
sufficient overview for now. The location of each perspective on the spectrum is crucial to 
understanding each view. They are organized by increasing emphasis on objective, 
independently existing evidence. Two extremes enclose the spectrum: fideism and rationalism. 
On one extreme, faith is independent of reason, while on the other, faith is completely supported 
by reason. Presuppositionalism assumes God, as there can be no direct independently existing 
proof; so, the system resides next to fideism – even if their claims of absolute certainty mirror the 
other side of the spectrum. Reformed Epistemology holds that faith is a properly basic belief, a 
type of direct knowing; although some rational arguments may be employed, none of them are 
warranted grounds for belief in God. Experientialism and Pragmatism each offer one 
independent ground for justified belief – i.e. experience and workability, respectively – hence 
their placement above the others. While experience tends to be more subjective, workability is 
more objective. Veridicalism accepts intuitive givens (like the prior views) and verification 
through evidence or reason (like the ensuing views).  
 
4 Brian K. Morley, Mapping Apologetics: Comparing Contemporary Approaches (Downers Grove: InterVarsity 









As the chart moves on, there is less an emphasis on intuitions and more an emphasis on 
objective evidence. Combinationalism’s three tests for truth – rational, empirical, and existential  
– provides more criteria for the proof of Christianity than the previous perspectives.5 Classical 
Apologetics embraces various arguments and evidences for theism and Christianity. However, in 
this system, “worldview determines the interpretation of facts.”6 In contrast, Evidentialism 
claims that the facts and evidence they provide suggests the correct interpretation — regardless 
of worldview. The boundaries of fideism and rationalism orient the majority of systematic 
apologetic methodologies, at least according to Morley.  
Steven B. Cowan’s Five Views on Apologetics is perhaps the categorization schema du jour 
of apologetic perspectives. The work offers five familiar views on apologetic method from well-
known advocates: Classical, Evidential, Presuppositional, Reformed Epistemology, and 
Cumulative Case.7 These five comprise the extremes, or outer boundaries, of Morley’s 
spectrum.8 Regardless of recent developments in apologetic methodology, often this framework 
comprises the only approaches that are offered to students or those who wish to defend their 
faith. Any approach via media is often neglected or trivialized. Based on popularity and utility, 
however, these methods cover the vast majority of apologetics practiced today, at least in the 
 
5 Clarification may be needed here: There seems to be two types of understandings when it comes to 
Combinationalism as an apologetic methodology. Morley’s understanding is that of approaches by apologists such 
as E.J. Carnell, Gordon Lewis, or Francis Schaeffer, as explored above. The term is also occasionally used as any 
approach that combines different apologetic methodologies, but this should not be confused with Morley’s 
categorization. For an example of the former, see Edward John Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics 
(William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1948). 
6 Morley, Mapping Apologetics, 24.  
7 Steven B. Cowan, Five Views on Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 2000). 
8 Although Cumulative Case is not listed on Morley’s spectrum, it shares similarities with Classical and Evidential 




Western world. Yet, this taxonomy remains incomplete — even the proponents within the work 
criticize the editors’ selected methods.9  
For comparison, Joshua Chatraw and Mark Allen provide another categorization schema for 
apologetic methodologies. The methods can be broken up into four quadrants, each with a hard 
and soft variant. According to them, the main apologetic methodologies can be explained by 
these four: (1) Classical Apologetics, (2) Evidential Apologetics, (3) Presuppositional 
Apologetics, and (4) Experiential/Narratival Apologetics (E/N).10 The leftmost quadrants, i.e. 
classical and evidential apologetics, are characterized by optimism towards reason apart from 
special revelation — and vice versa. Furthermore, they include Reformed Epistemology and 
Cumulative Case as separate prominent approaches, solely because they are not as defined in 
method as the others.11 Hard variants are rigid in their methodologies, whereas soft variants are 
more eclectic and see other approaches as cogent and valid.12 This distinction greatly clarifies 
many of the inner tensions of each system. While most of the approaches are familiar thus far, 
E/N offers another unique perspective.13 This approach emphasizes the particular framework that 
a person is in, which grounds their evidence and reasoning, and is suspicious against human’s 
reasoning capabilities — similar to presuppositionalists.14 However, E/N apologists — unlike 
 
9 For example, William Lane Craig humorously suggests the surprise of the editors in realizing their views are not so 
different after all! See William Lane Craig, “A Classical Apologist’s Response” in Five Views on Apologetics, 122.  
10 Josh Chatraw and Mark D. Allen, Apologetics at the Cross: An Introduction for Christian Witness (Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan Academic: 2018), 145.  
11 Chatraw and Allen, 145.  
12 Chatraw and Allen.  
13 An E/N approach differs slightly from experientialism on Morley’s spectrum. Pure experientialism is more of an 
extreme version of E/N and doesn’t include a narratival focus. While E/N is commonly practiced today and has 
gained a fair share of proponents, pure experientialism is rare. However, it would likely be located at a similar place 
on the spectrum.  




presuppositionalists — invite the nonbeliever into a story and experience.15 There are no proofs 
or rationalistic arguments. Rather, the nonbeliever is asked to try an experience and a grand 
narrative is illuminated. Depending on one’s definition of apologetics, one may or may not even 
consider an E/N approach as apologetics at all!16 Even though E/N has grown in recent years, 
especially as a response to postmodernism, the specific methods offered are usually marked by 
diversity, so a sustained and cohesive study of this approach remains to be seen.17  
However, an important distinction should be made regarding E/N methods and the use of 
narrative or testimony in apologetics. Narrative is a type of communication or delivery method 
that diverse people utilize. For example, Braxton Hunter’s fiction novel argues for the existence 
of God through classical apologetic arguments and methodology.18 More well-known authors, 
such as Fyodor Dostoyevsky or C.S. Lewis, tackle apologetic issues through storied medium as 
well. Stories, C.S. Lewis contemplated, “can mediate imaginative life to the masses while not 
being contemptible to the few.”19 A narrative approach is supplemental to other apologetic 
approaches, but is not necessarily a distinct system.20 Similarly, the use of testimony in 
apologetics is less of a system and more of a medium or supplement, as it is commonly 
recognized as an apologetic tool by various apologetic methods.21 For example, Nabeel Qureshi, 
 
15 Chatraw and Allen. 
16 For example, John Warwick Montgomery refers to these apologists as “non-apologetic apologists.” See 
Montgomery, “A Short History of Apologetics,” 28. 
17 Benno van den Toren, Christian Apologetics as Cross-Cultural Dialogue (London: T&T Clark, 2011), 4–5. 
18 Braxton Hunter, The Chronicles of Adonai: The Colony (San Antonia: Trinity Academic Press, 2016).  
19 C.S. Lewis, “On Stories” in Of Other Worlds: Essays and Stories (New York: Harper Collins, 2017), 18.  
20 McGrath, Narrative Apologetics, 8.  
21 See, for example, Norman Geisler and Patrick Zukeran, The Apologetics of Jesus: A Caring Approach to Dealing 




an ex-Muslim, practices apologetics through the sharing of his journey of becoming Christian.22 
Nevertheless, in his story and testimony resides other arguments for the faith. Most apologetic 
approaches incorporate the use of narrative or testimony among other, more prominent, tools. 
Thus, narrative and testimony as supplemental tools are distinct from an E/N methodology. 
 Certainly, there is no shortage of apologetic approaches. They are as diverse as fruit, each 
providing their own texture, flavor, and color. However, the list must be narrowed down to allow 
for proper examination. Thus, specific criteria must be met for inclusion. For the approach to be 
further analyzed, it must  
(a) be currently utilized in contemporary settings,  
(b) include one or many specific or actionable methodologies, 
(c) hold several notable proponents or adherents,  
and  
(d) be an established system (and not a tool or medium).23 
 
All the aforementioned apologetic approaches will be filtered through these criteria. To begin, 
rationalism will be excluded based on (a) and (c). Although some adapted models remain 
infrequently, rationalism tout court is rare. Morley disregards both pure experientialism and 
pragmatism for his own consideration since there are very few notable works and adherents 
supporting or outlining the claims, and thus, these will be excluded on account of (c).24 
Verificationalism, a category that includes veridicalism and combinationalism, is often 
characterized as a mixture of presuppositionalist and traditional apologetic methodologies, and 
while it does offer some unique contributions and perspectives, it will be not be included due to 
 
22 Nabeel Qureshi, Seeking Allah, Finding Jesus: A Devout Muslim Encounters Christianity (Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan, 2016), 17–18. 
23 These limitations were developed and explained in the first chapter.  




(c).25 Due to the nature of Verificationalism, however, much of the following research will 
directly apply to these views. Narrative and Testimonial Apologetics will not be included on 
basis of (d) since they are simply tools or mediums for persuasion across various approaches — 
they are not standalone systems. The use of narrative and testimony, though, will be substantially 
discussed in the following sections. 
Fideism may be harder to categorize.26 Most apologists view fideism as a denial of 
apologetics. If apologetics is defense of the faith through reason alone, then, evidently, this 
would be true. However, this is not to say that their method may not defend the faith — perhaps 
just not defend it well or in the same way. The idea of faith as a blind leap is appealing to some. 
How one defines “defense” will nonetheless influence their view of fideism. Whether technically 
apologetics or not, many claim it as at least biblically inadequate.27 Even Jesus, for example, 
offers arguments or grounds for belief (cf. Ac. 1:3; 17:31; Lk. 24:27). Fideistic apologetic 
approaches are rare, and commonly claimed proponents — such as Blaise Pascal or Tertullian — 
are usually misidentified as fideists.28 Thus, fideism will not be included on account of a mixture 
of (a), (b), and (c); even if some are debatable.   
Alvin Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology, similarly, is an interesting case. Although it 
fulfills the criteria for (a), (c), and (d), the question of methodology complicates the matter. His 
 
25 James Bielby, “Varieties of Apologetics,” in Christian Apologetics: An Anthology of Christian Sources, 37.  
26 The history of the term “fideism” is marked by controversy on its meaning. This label is hardly self-applied and 
functions similarly to the term “relativism” where the purpose is often not for clarity but for abuse. See Richard 
Amesbury, “Fideism”, The Stanford Handbook of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalt. 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/fideism/. 
27 Morley, Mapping Apologetics, 25–26. 
28 See, for example, Norman Geisler and Paul Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: A Christian Perspective (Grand 




perspective should be explored: How do we know that other people have minds, that they are not 
just elaborate robots? How do we know that the universe was not created five minutes ago with 
fabricated memories and the look of old age? There is no elaborate argument or evidence for it, it 
is something one simply believes; this is a basic belief, i.e. that which can be justifiably held 
without the need to appeal for arguments or proofs.29 Plantinga argues that belief in God can be 
properly basic. In other words, belief in God is warranted and justified whether or not one has or 
accepts evidence for it. Warrant is an important concept for Plantinga, as it is what distinguishes 
between knowledge and true belief. In order for something to have warrant, the belief must be 
produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties, in a cognitive environment appropriate for 
the faculties, and with a design that is successfully aimed towards truth (whether that be God or 
even guided evolution).30  
Plantinga creates two models for this known as the A/C and Extended A/C model.31 The 
A/C model focuses on John Calvin’s idea of the sensus divinitas, i.e. humans natural knowledge 
of God or sense of the divine, and Thomas Aquinas’ view of knowledge of God as implanted by 
nature. Although Plantinga disagrees with the implantation concept, he recognizes the sensus 
divinitas as a sort of cognitive faculty that produces these beliefs about God.32 This process 
meets all of Plantinga’s requirements for warrant, as stated previously, but is still affected by the 
 
29 John D. Laing, “Introduction to New Atheism: Apologetics and the Legacy of Alvin Plantinga”, Southwestern 
Journal of Theology 54 (1): 6–12, 9.   
30 Alvin Plantinga, Knowledge and Christian Belief (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
2015), 25–28.  
31 Plantinga, 30–56. 
32 Kevin Diller, Theology’s Epistemological Dilemma: How Karl Barth and Alvin Plantinga Provide a Unified 




fall and sin. For this reason, he develops his Extended A/C model, where he explains specific 
Christian theological beliefs with the elements of Scripture, the Holy Spirit, and faith.33 
Plantinga’s insights offered a radically different approach to apologetics. Reformed 
Epistemology differs from methods that focus on rational argumentation or evidence for belief.34 
For Plantinga, these are not needed for justified belief. Although he sees faith as a properly basic 
belief, Plantinga nonetheless highlights the importance of both positive apologetics, i.e. 
supporting beliefs with arguments for the Christian God, and negative apologetics, i.e. 
responding to critiques against Christianity.35 In fact, he even goes on to offer his own 
arguments, such as his famous free will defense.36 Regardless, Reformed Epistemology 
emphasizes how a person can be justified in their faith without the need for supporting 
evidence.37 Although it is technically an apologetic approach because it shows that Christian 
belief can be warranted, it excludes a specific practical methodology. As the name denotes, it is 
rather an epistemology. Thus, it will be excluded on account of (b). 
The remaining apologetic approaches can be condensed into wider categories since their 
strategies and structures are related. For example, while there are different types of 
Presuppositionalism — such as the unique approaches from Cornelius Van Til, John Frame, and 
Gordon Clark — the general approach is shared.38 Thus, these approaches will be combined for 
 
33 Kevin Diller, 148–151. 
34 William Edgar, Christian Apologetics Past and Present: A Primary Source Reader, Vol. 1 (Wheaton: Crossway, 
2009), 4.  
35 Morley, Mapping Apologetics, 135. 
36 Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, & Evil (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1974), 7–59. 
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use of analysis and critique. Any instances where the individual intricacies or nuances matter for 
the critique will be highlighted. The categorizations include three views: Presuppositionalism, 
containing all of the approaches that argue from God as a presupposition; Traditional 
Apologetics, including Evidentialism, Classical Apologetics, Cumulative Case, and similar views 
that argue to God; and Experiential/Narratival Apologetics, including the various proponents that 
form this elusive category. Now that the disparate views have been explored and selected, the 
remaining apologetic approaches will be summarized and subsequently examined by how their 
anthropological understandings affect their methodology. 
 
Presuppositionalism  
Nearing the top of Morley’s spectrum, presuppositionalism resides among views with a 
decreased emphasis on objective, independently existing evidence. Cornelius Van Til, Gordon 
Clark, and John Frame comprise some of the most cited and influential presuppositionalists. 
Their commitments to Calvinism prompt their methodology; so, a Reformed view of God and 
Scripture is usually necessary for their approach.39 Each provide his own nuances and 
differences, but often agree on essential concepts — summarized by adherence to belief in the 
triune God as a necessary presupposition.40  
 
39 Morley, 65. 
40 Van Til asserts this presupposition as the triune God of the Scriptures, whereas Gordon Clark would also 
emphasize the laws of logic, specifically the law of (non)contradiction. Later in his life, Clark’s epistemology and 
methodology shifted towards Scripturalism, the view that truth can only be deduced from the Bible, even before 
God, since Scripture provides the knowledge about God. For the shift in Clark’s views, see Ronald Nash, The 
Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark (Philipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1968), 173–174. For Clark’s 
view of Scripture relating to the knowledge of God, see Gordon H. Clark, An Introduction to Christian Philosophy 




 “A truly Protestant apologetic,” Cornelius Van Til insists, “must make it’s beginning from 
the presupposition that the triune God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, speaks to him with absolute 
authority in Scripture.”41 For adherents of this view, Christianity is a presupposition that cannot 
be done without. Since humankind is fallen and suffers the noetic effects of sin — i.e. the effects 
of sin on the mind which governs interpretation — all unbelievers presuppose their own 
autonomy and are biased against God.42 Unbelief is a matter of rebellion, not ignorance. The 
unbeliever actively suppresses their knowledge of God; they resist dependence on God.43 Every 
person interprets facts from their own worldview and presuppositions. Thus, there is not enough 
common ground for believers and unbelievers to reason on.  
The extent of this common ground is debated among presuppositionalists.44 Van Til holds 
that the only common ground is that they live in the same universe run by the same God — their 
metaphysical situation, so to speak — but there are no common notions or beliefs to be 
interacted with. Since all facts are interpreted by a worldview, believers and unbelievers 
necessarily have no overlap in epistemological grounds, even if psychologically there is apparent 
or “formal” overlap in beliefs. The truth nonbelievers know is considered “borrowed capital,” as 
it only makes sense within Christianity as the presupposition. John Frame disagrees. For him, 
knowledge is not all or nothing like Van Til argues: believers and unbelievers can truly 
 
41 Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 
1955), 179. 
42 Van Til, 119. 
43 Cornelius Van Til and William Edgar (ed.), Christian Apologetics, 2nd ed (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and 
Reformed Publishing Company, 1955), 118–119.  
44 For Frames’ critique of Van Til, see John Frame, The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God (Philipsburg: 
Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1987), 52–53. For more on Van Til’s perspective, see Morley, 




communicate and hold overlap in beliefs, otherwise nonbelievers would have an excuse for 
ignorance, and not have access to rational discussion or persuasion 
For stricter presuppositionalists like Van Til, traditional apologetics is abhorrent, then, since 
theistic arguments and evidences make humans the arbiters of truth rather than God, and any 
additional knowledge of God would be met with rebellion and the suppression of the truth.45 
Rather than appealing to “common notions” of the unbeliever and believer, apologists should 
appeal to the only common ground: their (suppressed) knowledge of God and their metaphysical 
situation.46 In this way, apologetics reflects confirmation bias more than an objective search for 
truth. Facts are not being objectively analyzed; one’s worldview and commitments interprets 
facts a certain way.  
Presuppositionalist methodology confronts the unbeliever with a reductio ad absurdum, i.e. 
an argument that leads a position to its logically absurd conclusion.47 God is a precondition for 
knowledge, thus, denial of God is absurd. Attempts to persuade through neutral reason are 
misguided. Evidently, nonbelievers can and do use logic and reason, but their worldview cannot 
account for what they are doing; there is an inconsistency in their utilization of logic and reason 
with their presuppositions.48 As Van Til succinctly asserts, “unless you believe in God you can 
logically believe in nothing else.”49 This is an indirect proof for God: although God cannot be 
 
45 Morley, Mapping Apologetics, 67, 72. 
46 Cornelius Van Til, “My Credo,” in Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on the Philosophy and 
Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til, ed. E.R. Geehan (Philipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1993), 21.  
47 Morley, Mapping Apologetics, 68–69. 
48 Greg Bahnsen, “A Transcendental Argument for God’s Existence” in Christian Apologetics: An Anthology of 
Primary Sources, 161.  
49 Cornelius Van Til, “Why I Believe in God” in The Works of Cornelius Van Til, 1895–1987, ed. Eric Sigward 




directly proven, belief in God is necessary for experience and thought.50 All reasoning is circular 
reasoning — the premises, the methods, and the conclusions are inevitably intertwined.51 
Believers presuppose truth, and hence, their conclusions are true. For Van Til, this approach will 
necessarily offend since nonbelievers should be confronted on their rebellion and self-idolatry.52  
Van Til and Frame exemplify the difference between hard presuppositionalism and a soft 
presuppositionalism. Hard presuppositionalists reject all use of direct proof and arguments, 
whereas soft presuppositionalists see no difference in direct or indirect proof, thus allowing for 
classical and evidentialist arguments.53 Frame allows for traditional apologetic reasoning, but 
only when aimed at transcendental goals: “God is the condition of all meaning… but that 
conclusion cannot be reached in a single, simple syllogism. A transcendental argument normally, 
perhaps always, requires many subarguments, and some of these may be traditional proofs or 
Christian evidences.”54 The ostensible similarities in dialogue and method between soft 
presuppositionalists and traditional apologists, then, appear indistinguishable. Hence, Frame 
suggests a “presuppositionalism of the heart” — the attitude of a person who understands God as 
the sovereign source of all rationality and meaning, that all people are biased, and that 
nonbelievers rebel against God. This attitude is expressed in dialogue with the nonbeliever — 
through diction, tone, and personal piety — and by allying with all apologists who posture 
 
50 Morley, Mapping Apologetics, 69–70. 
51 Van Til and Edgar, Christian Apologetics, 130. 
52 Van Til, “Why I Believe in God” in The Works of Cornelius Van Til, 1895–1987, Guide number 1976.e. 
53 Chatraw and Allen, Apologetics at the Cross, 159–161. 




similarly, regardless of affiliation.55 Instead of a preoccupation with apologetic methodology, as 
Van Til is often criticized of, Frame’s approach promotes developing arguments to address 
nonbelievers and thus fulfill the Great Commission.56  
Presuppositionalist anthropology is found primarily through their reading of Scripture. 
Unsurprisingly, this begins in the creation narrative. Humanity was created in the image of God 
(cf. Gen 1:27), but this is true in two senses: (1) in a wider view, humans reflect God’s image as 
they are personalities, i.e. they are like God in any way that creatures can be like God; and (2) in 
a narrower view, in which humanity was created with true knowledge, righteousness, and 
holiness.57 Christ comes to restore in humans the true knowledge, righteousness, and holiness.58 
Paul testifies of the new self that is “created to be like God in true righteousness and holiness” 
and is “being renewed in knowledge in the image of its Creator” (cf. Col. 3:10; Eph. 4:24). 
Certainly, God’s knowledge exceeds that of his creation, but before the fall humans fully 
understood the revelation of God promensura humana, i.e. within human’s finite capacity.59 
Humanity was created to relate to the universe in three ways: interpreting the world as a Prophet, 
dedicating the world to God as a Priest, and ruling over the world as King.60 The fall of humanity 
represents the desire to be independent of God; this autonomy confused finitude with sin and 
 
55 John Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God: An Introduction (Philipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed 
Publishing, 1994), 87–89. 
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perpetuates the idolatry of the self.61 Paul’s explanation of humanity’s condition in Romans 1:18-
22 (NRSV) reflects this autonomy:   
For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and wickedness 
of those who by their wickedness suppress the truth. For what can be known about 
God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. Ever since the creation of the 
world his eternal power and divine nature, invisible though they are, have been 
understood and seen through the things he has made. So they are without excuse; for 
though they knew God, they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him, but they 
became futile in their thinking, and their senseless minds were darkened. Claiming to 
be wise, they became fools; and they exchanged the glory of the immortal God for 
images resembling a mortal human being or birds or four-footed animals or reptiles.62 
 
Although God and his divine attributes are tacitly believed, the gospel remains misunderstood 
and obscure (cf. Rom. 10:14-15).63 Salvation, as would be consistent with Reformed theology, is 
not dependent on persons, but on God alone; the gospel is not to be accepted or rejected as they 
please.64 Regardless of the pluralistic state of the world, there are really only two religions 
humans have to decide upon.65 As Paul explores, there is only the wisdom of God and the 
wisdom of the world (cf. 1 Cor. 1:18-2:16). Furthermore, due to humanity’s self-bondage and 
rebellion, God must empower unbelievers to accept salvation (Rom. 9:14-23; Eph. 2:8).66  
Presuppositionalists’ view of humanity and Scripture (in)directly correlate to their method. 
Since the fall of humanity affects their cognitive faculties and influences their desire for 
autonomy, people are in a state of rebellion against God. The depth of this rebellion is so 
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immense that they subdue the truth they already hold; they do not need to be confronted with 
traditional proofs and arguments for the faith — they already believe! The only way to confront 
the unbeliever is by their presuppositions. The dissonance within the nonbeliever’s own belief 
system points to the necessity of God. To deny recognition of God as the necessary 
presupposition to all thought is to head for nihilism or a less consistent worldview living off of 
borrowed capital.67 While the defense of the faith is made through the transcendental argument, 
salvation is solely a gift from God. Whether or not the sinner accepts the Christian worldview is 
a matter of the grace of God.68  
A few assumptions appear to inundate presuppositionalist approaches. First, the primary 
goal of presuppositionalist apologetics is to demonstrate that Christian belief is true.69 This is 
evinced through the transcendental argument. Defending the faith, then, means that the Christian 
worldview be shown as necessary and true. Of course, salvation comes solely from God, thus, 
conversion does not come from presenting the Christian worldview as true. Rather, 
presuppositionalist apologetics merely indicates the truth of the worldview. Second, humans are 
seen primarily as believing creatures. Humans (as believers) are defined by their beliefs, 
allegiances, and commitments that orient their life. Before any ideas or thoughts, beliefs are 
already assumed — people’s worldviews are pre-rational.70 Humans do not simply need a slight 
adjustment to their ideas or thoughts — they need a radical subversion of their whole belief 
system and worldview. 
 
67 R.C Sproul, The Consequences of Ideas: Understanding the Concepts that Shape Our World (Wheaton: 
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Traditional Apologetics  
Nearing the bottom of Morley’s spectrum, traditional apologetics resides among views with an 
increased emphasis on objective, independently existing evidence. A variety of Christian 
thinkers comprise this field, including William Lane Craig, Norman Geisler, J.P. Moreland, Gary 
Habermas, Michael Licona, John Warwick Montgomery, Paul Feinberg, and C.S. Lewis. These 
methods, contrary to presuppositionalism, argue to God as the conclusion.71 All of these 
proponents would utilize several arguments for the existence of the Christian God — whether by 
theistic arguments, historical evidences, religious experiences, or a combination of them — 
although it is accomplished in different ways. Classical and evidential approaches offer 
standalone arguments as proof of the Christian God, whereas a cumulative case approach 
defends the Christian God through a collection of interdependent evidences and arguments.72  
Classical apologetics tends to follow a succinct method: prove theism, then Christianity.73 
The approach is a two-step process. The classical apologist begins with the common ground — 
i.e. shared beliefs — between believers and nonbelievers.74 If the nonbeliever interacts with 
science, philosophy, and history, then what better place for the apologist to ground their 
arguments? A nonbeliever likely embraces sense perception, self evidence, and common modes 
of reasoning.75 Thus, common ground comprises of shared beliefs and methodologies, such as 
 
71 Morley, Mapping Apologetics, 288. 
72 Gary Habermas, “An Evidentialist’s Response,” in Five Views of Apologetics, 184–185. 
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deduction, induction, Bayes’ theorem, possible world semantics, and understandings of the law 
of contradiction, necessity, and contingency.76 The classical apologist appeals to widely accepted 
facts, common sense, unbiased (or anti-Christian) expert testimony, and propounds a cumulative 
case of arguments.77 William Lane Craig also briefly suggests that arational conditions, such as 
courteousness or genuine concern, may affect persuasiveness and that the ultimate apologetic is 
one’s life, i.e. their relationship with God and others.78  
Craig distinguishes between knowing the faith to be true, and showing the faith to be true.79 
A Christian knows their beliefs to be true because they are properly basic based on the internal 
testimony of the Holy Spirit, even though rational arguments may confirm the faith.80 However, 
evidences and arguments demonstrate that the Christian worldview is the most plausible option 
by showing the faith to be true.81 The apologetic task, then, is showing the faith to be true by the 
 
76 Hunter, Evangelistic Apologetics, 55 
77 Craig, Reasonable Faith, 56. Craig’s recommendation of a cumulative case of arguments does not equate to 
cumulative case apologetics. This has caused confusion around methodology. Both classical and evidential 
apologists employ multiple arguments for the defense of the faith; in this sense, cumulative case simply means using 
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the Christian God as the best explanation of all evidence. Chatraw and Allen, more confusingly, revise cumulative 
case to mean any apologetic methodology that emphasizes the multiplicity of ways to make a case for the Christian 
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two-step approach. The step order (usually) matters for classical apologists. However, this issue 
would be what separates hard classical apologists from soft classical apologists.82  
Hard classical apologists, such as Norman Geisler, assert that proving theism first is 
necessary; without this first step, historical arguments hold no meaning since they are understood 
through an atheistic worldview.83 The theistic worldview is what makes the resurrection a 
relevant and significant event. Soft classical apologists, such as William Lane Craig, believe 
there may be cases where historical evidences may lead to direct belief in the Christian God; so 
while it is not a necessary order, he believes the classical approach as being more effective.84 In 
fact, soft classical apologists and soft evidential apologists — who allow or utilize theistic 
arguments — become hard to distinguish. Craig suggests that rather than being separate 
methodologies, they are “merely a personally preferred style of argumentation.”85 
Classical apologists utilize a variety of arguments to prove theism. Norman Geisler and 
Frank Turek offer four popular evidences for theism: (1) the beginning of the universe, via the 
cosmological argument; (2) the design of the universe, via the teleological argument and 
anthropic principle; (3) the design of life, via the teleological argument; and (4) moral law, via 
the moral argument.86 A few classical apologists also utilize an adapted version of the 
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controversial ontological argument.87 Although the ontological argument has revived in recent 
history, many apologists, such as Geisler, find it problematic, however fascinating.88 These 
arguments are the most prevalent theistic proofs for classical apologists, albeit each apologist 
explains and nuances the arguments in different ways.  
The subsequent strategy argues, alongside evidential apologetics, specifically for the 
Christian God. Most often, this is done through a defense of the resurrection of Jesus, the 
identity of Jesus, and the historical reliability of the New Testament.89 One common approach is 
the use of abductive logic, which analyzes the available evidence, and then infers the best 
explanation of the evidence.90 The widely accepted facts surrounding the resurrection — such as 
the empty tomb found by women, the appearances of a living Jesus to various groups and 
individuals, and the first disciples belief in Jesus without historical Judaic or pagan influences — 
infer that God raised Jesus from the dead.91 Craig concludes,  
“If these three facts are historically established with a reasonable degree of certainty 
(and it seems to me that they can, as they are recognized by the majority of New 
testament critics today) and if alternative naturalistic explanations for these facts are 
untenable (and the consensus of scholarship is that they are), then unless the 
resurrection hypothesis is shown to be even more untenable than its failed competitors 
 
87 Two notable classical apologists who have defended the ontological argument, or at least their version, are 
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(and my experience in debating the comparative merits of the hypotheses convince me 
that it is not)… [the preferred explanation is that] God raised Jesus from the dead.”92  
 
Geisler and Turek provide a slightly different approach. After proving theism, they argue for the 
historical reliability of the New Testament first, and then for miraculous confirmations of Jesus’ 
claims to be God.93 This approach greatly overlaps with evidentialism.  
Evidential apologists, in contrast to classical apologists, argue for a one-step approach: they 
attempt to prove the Christian God. Unsurprisingly, then, their method is ostensibly the same as 
the classical apologists’ second step. Granted, evidentialists contribute their own unique 
perspectives. Gary Habermas, for example, slightly changes the oft used minimal facts approach. 
The traditional minimal facts approach argues first through the reliability of the New Testament, 
and subsequently to supernatural beliefs, e.g. Jesus’ deity, the resurrection, and inspiration of 
Scripture.94 This can be reflected in Geisler and Turek’s view above. The problem with this 
traditional approach, according to Habermas, is that “it would be difficult to argue from general 
trustworthiness of the Bible in a way that makes its supernatural claims credible while showing 
that those of other ancient authors are not.”95 So, instead, he argues from five widely-accepted 
facts surrounding the resurrection, and assesses them with five principles historians use to 
validate ancient documents.96 This approach proves Jesus’ resurrection is the most probable and 
 
92 Craig. 
93 To be more precise, after proving theism, Geisler and Turek argue that miracles are possible and can be used for 
confirmation, that the New Testament is historically reliable, that Jesus claimed to be God, and that this is 
miraculously confirmed. Thus, Jesus is God, and he teaches the Bible to be true. For an in-depth examination of 
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reasonable explanation of the historical evidence.97 Certainly, the classical apologist may utilize 
Habermas’ approach as well.  
To the evidentialist, not only can humans approach facts objectively, but facts point to their 
interpretation.98 While nonbelievers may resist facts in sinful autonomy, that does not equate to 
facts being unconvincing or unable to overcome self-interest.99 As previously mentioned, 
classical apologists, in contrast, believe that facts have no interpretation or meaning outside of a 
worldview. The classical approach shares more in common with presuppositionalism since a 
correct framework for reasoning is necessary. Contrarily, the evidentialist asserts a one-step 
approach because people can analyze the facts and come to the most probable conclusion without 
needing a specific worldview. The historical facts and evidence points to the truth itself. Hard 
evidentialists, although rare, would resist all classical theistic arguments; soft evidentialists such 
as Gary Habermas, on the other hand, allow or utilize theistic arguments but view them as 
unnecessary.100  
Gary Feinberg develops the most commonly cited cumulative case apologetic method. 
According to both Feinberg and Habermas, this cumulative case approach can be seen as a 
progeny or modification of (soft) evidentialism, and they predominantly agree on the following: 
the one-step approach, the correspondence of facts to their interpretation (even without a neutral 
standpoint), the reliability of historical evidences, and multiple means of apologetic defense.101 
 
97 Habermas and Licona, 209.  
98 Morley, Mapping Apologetics, 23. 
99 John Warwick Montgomery suggests this in an email correspondence. See Morley, 300–301.  
100 Chatraw and Allen, Apologetics at the Cross, 154–155. Gary Habermas knows of no evidentialists that oppose 
theistic arguments, see Morley, Mapping Apologetics, 326.  
101 See Paul D. Feinberg and Gary R. Habermas, Five Views on Apologetics, 129–131, 184. Unlike Habermas, James 




Additionally, Feinberg incorporates other human experiences, such as “contingency and 
orderliness; the experience of God’s presence and a relationship with him, which many claim to 
have had; the existence of a moral law; a revelation that claims to come from God; and 
prophecies that are contained in this revelation that are fulfilled.”102 He proposes seven prevalent 
tests for truth that resolve conflicting truth claims: the tests of consistency, correspondence, 
comprehensiveness, simplicity, livability, fruitfulness, and conservation.103 Given these tests for 
truth, Feinberg concludes that the Christian worldview offers the best explanation given all the 
evidence. The uniqueness of this perspective is that rather than offer several independent 
arguments for the faith, the strength of the argument is found in the mosaic, or interdependent 
connectivity, of the various arguments.104 The burden of proof does not rely on independent 
arguments, but the combination of them.  
 
evidentialism, since multiple arguments are assembled and converged. Technically, they both can be correct 
depending on how one defines the steps. It is true that the approach uses several different lines of evidence and 
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All three of these methods utilize both positive and negative apologetics.105 Positive 
apologetics offers reasons and arguments for the faith; all of the aforementioned arguments used 
by traditional apologists represent this. Negative apologetics seeks to defend the faith through 
answering objections raised against it; perhaps the biggest objection to the faith is the problem of 
evil, so an apologetic response would fall in this category.106 Of course, oftentimes arguments 
may serve a dual-function for both purposes.107 Norman Geisler’s rigorous work, Christian 
Apologetics, exemplifies the interaction of these two. He systematically critiques various tests of 
truth and worldviews, and offers his own arguments for the Christian faith, while refuting all 
raised objections in the process.108  
Traditional apologetics is more akin to a legal case than a friendly conversation. Craig 
mentions that his approach may be “polarizing and combative,” yet this is necessary because 
“you’re not arguing against another person; you’re arguing against his case.”109 When 
apologetics equates to demonstrating the rationality of the Christian faith to rational creatures, 
 
105 Cowan, Five Views of Apologetics, 8.  
106 Plantinga’s free will defense remains a viable and prevalent argument against the problem of evil. See Plantinga, 
God, Freedom, & Evil, 7–59. 
107 Craig provides an example: certain defenses against the problem of evil can serve as moral arguments. See Craig, 
Reasonable Faith, 23–24.    
108 In Christian Apologetics, Part I examines and critiques grounds for testing truth; Part II applies the tests to 
various worldviews, concluding theism as the proper worldview; and Part III examines the claims of Christianity 
from a theistic worldview. See Geisler, Christian Apologetics. 
109 William Lane Craig, “#334 Are Debates Too Polarizing?”, last modified September 9, 2013. 
https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/are-debates-too-polarizing. In a response to a long-
winded question regarding his debates being polarizing, Craig responds with helpful insights into his methodology. 
Even though the question is framed in reference to formal debates, Craig discusses “other forums of truth-seeking.” 
This is not to say Craig would necessarily be combative if, say, a young college student approach him one-on-one 
asking about the faith. Rather, this would likely be slipping into the field of evangelism for Craig, which is more 
personal, emotional, and so on. When he offers and critiques arguments, however, it is surely de-personalizing and 




the approach is “by nature de-personalizing.”110 This de-personalization is perhaps why soft 
traditional apologists resist a more rigid approach and, rather, include other methods 
sporadically, like narrative apologetics, in order to impact more people. Cumulative Case 
apologists, for example, add religious and human experiences to the persuasion among logical or 
historical evidences, in order to present every possible fact for the unbeliever.111 Montgomery 
also identifies a growing number of “tender-minded” people who see life in more subjective or 
existential terms, so, he suggests a literary apologetic method in lieu of objective 
argumentation.112 He concludes stories are effective because they are relevant to life, answering 
the main needs of humanity: an integrated personality, genuine fellowship, and purpose.113 For 
him, this alternative approach may be necessary because many will simply deny even the most 
obvious conclusion of evidences. Similarly, Craig supplements his positive apologetic work, 
Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, with a brief addendum claiming that the 
ultimate apologetic is one’s life, i.e. relationship with God and others.114 Christians’ love 
inevitably draws people to Christ. When engaged in apologetic dialogue, especially, there are 
existential considerations that make an argument persuasive. Craig, for this reason, alludes to 
arational factors (as previously mentioned) and encourages presenting arguments alongside the 
gospel and a personal testimony.115 
 
110 Craig. 
111 Hunter, Evangelistic Apologetics, 62–63. 
112 Morley, Mapping Apologetics, 319–320. 
113 Morley, 320–321. 
114 Craig, Reasonable Faith, 405–407.  




The main concerns of traditional apologetic anthropology are the human condition (and 
solution), human knowledge, and the nature of human beings. Although the exact 
anthropological understandings slightly differ among the various proponents of traditional 
apologetics, there is enough overlap to present a unique and cohesive view — especially separate 
from presuppositionalism and experiential/narratival apologetics. For traditional apologists, 
humans are essentially rational beings, reflecting the nature of God.116 The imago dei endowed 
humans with reason, moral action, and self-determination, among other debatable qualities.117 
This requires human beings to possess some form of free will, power, and knowledge.118 
Cartesian dualism and the possibility of disembodiment are usually held by traditional 
apologists.119 This is unsurprising, given the lingering influence of rationalism on traditional 
apologetics.120 
The role of reason in apologetics is nuanced within their view of the human condition and 
human knowledge. Without the help of the Spirit, humans would never become followers of 
Christ: people, left to themselves, do not seek God (Rom 3:10-11); they cannot understand 
spiritual things (1 Cor. 2:14); and they are antagonistic towards God (Rom 8:7).121 The Spirit 
constantly draws the nonbeliever, continually convicting him/her so all people know the truth of 
 
116 Morley, Mapping Apologetics, 303. 
117 J.P. Moreland, The Recalcitrant Imago Dei: Human Persons and the Failure of Naturalism (London: SCM Press, 
2009), 4–5. See also William Lane Craig, “Doctrine of Man (Part 2)”, last modified September 23, 2013, 
https://www.reasonablefaith.org/podcasts/defenders-podcast-series-2/s2-doctrine-of-man/doctrine-of-man-part-2. 
118 Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), x; cited in Brian Morley, 
Mapping Apologetics: Comparing Contemporary Approaches, 199. 
119 Moreland, The Recalcitrant Imago Dei, 104–142. 
120 McGrath, Narrative Apologetics, 12–17, esp. 16–17. 




God’s existence and their position before him (John 16:7-11).122 Arguments and evidences for 
the Christian God will never “reason” people into the faith.123 Thus, if a person refuses to come 
to Christ, it is not simply because of a deficiency in knowledge, but a suppression or ignoring of 
the Spirit’s drawing; evidence and arguments cannot transform a hostile and closed heart.124 As 
Geisler and Turek frame it, there is “a difference between proving a proposition and accepting a 
proposition.”125 There is freedom to accept or reject the faith. There is enough evidence to 
convince, but God leaves ambiguity to not compel those unwilling.126 Regardless, people can 
help draw others to God. Even if the Spirit alone converts, the Spirit utilizes humans in the 
process.127 This is often done through persuasion or appeals. Their main form of persuasion 
utilizes arguments and evidences to show the rationality of believing in God — it is an appeal to 
the nonbeliever’s mind. Jesus, too, utilizes argumentation and evidences (cf. Ac. 1:3; 17:31; Lk. 
24:27). Whether or not one accepts the arguments, however, does not determine their 
legitimacy.128 But, since the persuasiveness of an argument depends on the individual, arguments 
should be made to use widely accepted notions.129 Regardless, many people do not need 
arguments to come to the faith.130 
 
122 Craig. Also see Habermas and Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus, 32. 
123 Craig, 47. Also see Habermas and Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus, 33. 
124 Craig. Also see Habermas and Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus, 35. 
125 Geisler and Turek, I Don’t Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist, 30. 
126 Geisler and Turek, 31. 
127 Craig, Reasonable Faith, 407. Also see Habermas and Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus, 34. 
128 Craig, 60. 
129 Craig, 55–57.  




Perhaps the largest internal distinction in anthropology surrounds the controversy of facts 
and their interpretations, involving human knowledge and the human condition. Evidentialists 
uphold that the fall did not damage humanity’s ability to understand facts, whether religious or 
not.131 Adam, indeed, still recognizes God’s voice after his sin (Gen 3:8-10). Certainly, humans 
have sinful biases, but this does not remove their ability to overcome the biases, especially when 
presented with overwhelming evidence.132 Classical apologists, on the contrary, usually hold that 
worldview determines facts; thus, they must be persuaded to a theistic worldview first. Soft 
classical approaches align more with the evidentialist’s stance. For Geisler, a hard classical 
apologist, the historical evidences make no sense outside of a theistic worldview.133 
A few assumptions appear to inundate these approaches. First, the primary goal of 
apologetics is to demonstrate the rationality of Christian belief.134 Defending the faith, in these 
approaches, means that the Christian worldview be shown as logical, reasonable, and most 
plausible. Of course, this is usually not the only aim, as demonstrating Christianity to be true or 
that one should commit their life to Christ are often secondary or tertiary goals; yet they are 
subsequent to the primary aim. As noted earlier, the Christian faith is shown to be true through 
demonstrating its rationality. The logical arguments and evidences are meant to show that the 
faith is rational; believers, nonbelievers, and the general culture should see faith as an 
intellectually plausible, or the most plausible, option. Traditional apologetics need not always 
show the faith to be true entirely, unlike presuppositionalists, for showing Christianity as merely 
 
131 Montgomery, “A Short History of Apologetics,” 27. 
132 Morley, Mapping Apologetics, 300–301.  
133 Morley, 266. 
134 Bielby, “Varieties of Apologetics,” 30–32. Certainly there are other goals, such as showing Christianity to be 




a reasonable option is enough.135 Second, the method focuses on humans as rational beings. 
Humans are essentially a mind or consciousness; they are defined mainly by thought and rational 
operations. This model tends to deny humans as essentially embodied — perhaps occasionally or 
temporarily, but not essentially — and views the role of emotions or affections as largely 
irrelevant, if not something to be overcome.136 Clearly, this model permeates their apologetic 
methodology as the mind is primarily appealed to through reason, and the role of reason and 
cognition in determining both truth and belief is viewed very positively. This will be more 
apparent in the next section upon comparison since E/N methodologies strongly resist this model 
for a more holistic view of a human person.  
 
Experiential / Narratival Apologetics 
Experiential and Narratival apologetics (E/N) represents an interesting counter to the prior 
fastidious methodologies. The former methodological foci emphasize rationality and 
presuppositions through detailed argument(s); E/N, in contrast, is usually pessimistic towards 
these endeavors.137 Since this approach is more ill-defined and ambiguous than the others, it can 
be hard to place proponents into this view confidently and uncritically. However, it will likely 
include proponents such as Myron Penner, C. Stephen Evans, N.T. Wright, Alister McGrath, and 
John Stackhouse. Although they are not necessarily contemporary, many E/N thinkers often refer 
 
135 Craig, Reasonable Faith, 16–23.  
136 Smith, Desiring the Kingdom, 41–43. As previously mentioned, soft traditional apologists are more likely to 
consider arational factors and means, such as emotion and narrative or testimony, yet these means are for 
persuasion, and not viewed positively as reliable means of truth outside of reason. 




to the ideas of Blaise Pascal or Søren Kierkegaard.138 Several other recent apologetic works may 
share commonality, more or less, with this approach: “ad hoc apologetics” of George Lindbeck; 
“postliberal apologetics” of Meredith Handspicker; “dialogical apologetics” of David Clark; 
“postmodern apologetics” of Nancy Murphy; “person-centered apologetics” of J.S. Brent and 
D.E. Chismar; “unapologetic apologetics” of William Placher; “narrative apologetics” of David 
Clark; “holistic apologetics” of Irving Hexham, Stephen Rost, and John Morehead; and “cross-
cultural apologetics” of Benno van den Toren.139 Although E/N approaches offer more diversity 
than within the former apologetic categories, they converge upon shared foci. Several focused 
themes permeate these approaches: (1) lived experience, (2) narrative or story, (3) appeals to 
“holistic” and unique persons, (4) limitations of human reason, (5) community, (6) pre-rational 
factors of belief, (7) apologetic dialogue, (8) methods that appeal to postmodernism or a multi-
cultural world, (9) critiques of traditional apologetic methods and epistemologies, and (10) the 
aim of apologetics as conversion and maturation or edification.140  
Reason itself as an arbiter of truth is questioned in E/N approaches. Thinking is not neutral 
nor objective for them; all facts must be interpreted through subjective beings. Blaise Pascal 
 
138 This may seem alarming, since some view Pascal and Kierkegaard as fideists; but whether or not they were 
fideists is often a matter of controversy. Norman Geisler holds that Pascal is more of an antirationalist than a fideist, 
and similarly Kierkegaard as well, except for the fact that he held some fideistic claims. Myron Penner, a E/N 
apologist, builds his apologetic method from Kierkegaard, rejecting the notion that he is a fideist. He is not opposed 
to reason, but the modern conception of reason. It is exactly the antirationalist thread that I believe E/N approaches 
adapt. For Geisler’s view, see Geisler, Christian Apologetics, 35–42. For Penner’s view, see Myron Penner, The End 
of Apologetics: Christian Witness in a Postmodern Context (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2013), 10–11. For a 
more in-depth analysis of Kierkegaard’s epistemology, see M.G. Piety, “Søren Kierkegaard,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Epistemology of Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 497–509. 
139 Toren, Christian Apologetics as Cross-Cultural Dialogue, 4–5.  
140 For (1) and (2), see Chatraw and Allen, Apologetics at the Cross, 161–163. For (3), (4), (5) see Bielby, “Varieties 
of Apologetics,” 34–36. For (6), (7), (8), (9), see Toren, Christian Apologetics as Cross-Cultural Dialogue, 4–5. For 
(10), see John G. Stackhouse Jr., Humble Apologetics: Defending the Faith Today (New York: Oxford University 




famously wrote that “the heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing,” and that it is “the 
heart which perceives God and not the reason.”141 The “heart” for Pascal represents a person’s 
immediate intuitions; before any thoughts, there are the first-principles known by the heart, 
which all reason is dependent upon.142 Unlike fideism, this is not a complete dismissal of reason; 
however, it recognizes the limitations of reason as influenced by other factors. Pascal continues: 
“Anyone who chose to follow reason alone would have proved himself a fool… Reason never 
wholly overcomes imagination, while the contrary is quite common.”143 Reason is subsumed by 
the heart and passions — it cannot be the whole ground for truth; this explains how Pascal can 
claim that uneducated and unintelligent people may be more certain of spiritual and existential 
truths than many who are educated and intelligent.144 Reason helps make sense of the world and 
revelation, but it is not the sole grounds for truth or the gospel.145 Pascal’s wager actually reveals 
the inherent biases within a person: if it is wiser to believe in God, why not believe?146 Humans 
are naturally biased either for or against God, and reason cannot decide the truth, so one should 
be biased towards God.  
 
141 Blaise Pascal, Pensées, loc. 423–424.  
142 Peter Kreeft, Christianity for Modern Pagans (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), 228.  
143 Pascal, Pensées, loc. 44.  
144 Stackhouse Jr., Humble Apologetics, 150. 
145 Chatraw and Allen, Apologetics at the Cross, 161–163. Kierkegaard’s distinction between Geniuses and Apostles 
highlight this point. The genius, or expert, is the highest intellectual authority in modernity; reason is the grounds for 
truth in this framework. Apostles, however, appeal to revelation and not reason. He combats the notion that reason 
or geniuses can offer truth. Reason may help one understand the apostle’s proclamation, but it cannot ground their 
message. For more on this, see Myron Penner, The End of Apologetics, 49–66, 170. 
146 Pascal’s wager, succinctly, proposes that if someone chooses God and is wrong, he/she loses nothing; and if 
right, reaps eternal life. However, if instead he/she does not choose God, and is right, they gain nothing; but if he/she 




Humans are comprised of prejudices, emotions, will, and imagination — all which affect 
reasoning. A holistic human is “a social, emotional, religious, and cultural entity, with certain 
drives and living in a specific context.”147 These complex drives and contexts of a human shape 
identity and decisions.148 For example, Kierkegaard claims that obedience to God is grounded on 
passionate love, a desire that causes action; a zeal for propositions will not lead to such action.149 
The identity and decision of the obedient Christian is formed through their desire and direction 
of love towards God. Reason is situated within the unique commitments that shapes the 
framework for how people think, act, and believe.150 There is no neutral starting point — reason 
and truth are always caught up in a social context alongside assumptions, presuppositions, 
practices, and vocabularies which influence them.151 In this way, modernistic understandings of 
reason, and thus traditional apologetics, may actually be harmful to defense of the faith.152 For 
example, apologetics may perpetuate systematic or ideological violence, since it can be 
overcome by the “powers of the prevailing culture.”153 Whereas traditional apologists focus more 
 
147 Toren, Christian Apologetics as Cross-Cultural Dialogue, 27.  
148 Toren, 24.  
149 Sproul, Consequences of Ideas, 154. 
150 Penner, The End of Apologetics, 74. 
151 Penner, 130.  
152 David K. Clark, Dialogical Apologetics: A Person-Centered Approach to Christian Defense (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Books, 1993), 103–104. This is a very common theme of E/N approaches, however they all tend to offer 
different reasons. For Kierkegaard, this use of reason has the opposite effect, as “thought moves existence away 
from the real.” Thought will never lead to what is real — it must be the opposite. See Sproul, Consequences of 
Ideas,155. For Penner arguments have an ethical aspect that can be violent, see Penner, The End of Apologetics, 9–
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on the content of argumentation, E/N apologists emphasize the way or style of apologetic 
dialogue, for this reason.154  
Truths ineluctably “come to us in story form and must be embraced and lived out in order to 
be truly understood.”155 This epistemological model rejects reason as tantamount in seeking 
truth. The truth is not a set of propositions or ideas to mentally ascend to; the faith (and thus 
truth) must be lived and embodied.156 A comical metaphor may render this presumption more 
comprehensible: Imagine a desperate and libidinous young man, pining for companionship, 
craftily constructing his dating profile to fulfill his desires. In an attempt to be genuine, he 
scrupulously writes out everything that can be said about himself. Given an infinite time frame, 
he finally finishes the task. To his horror, he realizes there is still something missing about 
himself — his existence. Even though all the facts about himself are written out and understood, 
it is not truly him. Existence cannot be thought or conceived — it must be lived. Similarly, being 
a Christian is much less about knowing the truth than becoming the truth; it is a way rather than a 
position.157 Knowledge of the truth follows from being the truth.158 Thus, traditional arguments 
or proofs for God are asinine — a fool’s endeavor.159 Instead, Christians should invite people to 
 
154 These dialogue “tactics” often include listening and understanding, gentleness, love, grace, friendship, narrative, 
sharing the gospel, avoiding manipulation and power dynamics, viewing the audience holistically, and building 
bridges between worldviews. It is an audience-sensitive approach. See examples in Toren, Christian Apologetics as 
Cross-Cultural Dialogue, 155–210.; Stackhouse Jr., Humble Apologetics, 161–226.; and Clark, Dialogical 
Apologetics, 102–122.   
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hear and embrace the gospel, and to experience Christianity. Proof of God is found within the 
lived witness and testimony of the church, both individually and communally.160 The church is a 
prophetic witness to their neighbor by means of self-giving love.161 Concisely, “the church 
doesn’t have an apologetic; it is an apologetic.”162 “The final test of the Christian scheme,” 
William Alston suggests, “comes from trying it out in one’s own life, testing the promises the 
scheme tells us God has made, following the way enjoined on us by the Church and seeing 
whether it leads to new life in the Spirit.”163 
Unsurprisingly, these approaches are heavily critiqued by traditional apologists and 
academics with a more modernist framework of reason. Perhaps this is why E/N proponents are 
often mislabeled as fideists; it is not that they believe faith and reason are completely separate, 
but they do certainly view the association through a different framework.164 This perception led 
to the neglect of E/N approaches as possible apologetic methodologies by many. Even those who 
do acknowledge them as distinct or viable methodologies often qualify their terminology: John 
Warwick Montgomery labels this experiential approach as “non-apologetic apologetics”; James 
K. A. Smith refers to this method as a type of “unapologetics”; Myron Penner, perhaps the most 
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blunt with his aptly titled The End of Apologetics, asserts he is “against apologetics.”165 Penner’s 
diction clarifies the idea: he wishes to completely redefine the apologetic task; he is against the 
traditional way of doing apologetics.166 This critique resonates for many today, as this 
“traditional” way is seen as reductionist and untenable; perhaps especially for pentecostals.167 
Smith reflects on the early pentecostal community at the Azusa Street revival: 
“their experience of meeting God in embodied worship led them to resist and reject the 
rationalism of modernity in favour of an understanding that gave primacy to the 
affections, to the ‘heart’. In other words, the philosophical anthropology embedded in 
pentecostal faith and practice does not yield a ‘thinking thing,’ but rather an embodied 
heart that ‘understands’ the world in ways that are irreducible to the categories and 
propositions of cognitive ‘reason’… [pentecostal epistemology] does not constitute a 
rejection of cognition or propositional truth; but it does situate and relativize that 
particular mode of knowing.”168 
 
Pentecostal spirituality espouses a pre-theoretical knowledge that affirms the whole person and 
an affective and narrative epistemic practice.169 Pentecostalism and E/N approaches both 
emphasize pre-rational knowledge, experience as necessary for truth, “holistic” human beings as 
narrative and affective creatures, the importance of community for truth, and the Church and 
 
165 For Montgomery, see Montgomery, “A Short History of Apologetics,” 28. For Smith, see Smith, Who’s Afraid of 
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Christian as witness.170 Thus, a pentecostal apologetic strategy would likely follow along E/N 
lines, such as employing invitation and testimony, with the purpose and aim for others to follow 
Jesus and be transformed by the relationship and story.171 This type of approach precludes the 
“professionalization” of apologetics: witness is for all, not simply an intellectual or academic 
elite.172 Perhaps the similar positions on propositional truths, reason, and witness are what make 
categorization, then, elusive for both E/N and pentecostalism. 
There are both hard and soft E/N approaches. A hard E/N approach focuses solely on 
experiential and narratival “defenses” of the faith, rejecting logical and historical arguments in 
the process; whereas a soft approach would likely employ those arguments, but still have a 
penchant for the experiential and narratival as the primary method.173 Myron Penner would lean 
towards a hard approach, while N.T. Wright would be an exemplar of the soft approach.174 E/N 
apologists with a hard approach are usually wrongly critiqued as fideists, and soft E/N apologists 
typically may appear hard to distinguish or categorize at all — especially from cumulative case 
apologetics. Interestingly, Alvin Plantinga may be considered a conglomeration of soft 
 
170 Rickie D. Moore’s four key aspects of a Pentecostal hermeneutic reflect this: (1) the Holy Spirit addresses us in 
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presuppositionalism and a soft E/N approach.175 Since the dissimilitude between apologetics and 
evangelism becomes more ambiguous in E/N approaches, some proponents may not even be 
commonly considered apologists. Yet, they offer a distinct apologetic approach.  
An E/N anthropological and scriptural understanding inevitably differs from the prior 
methods, albeit they share more in common with presuppositionalism. One of the fundamental 
claims of this approach is that human beings are holistic and multi-dimensional creatures; this is 
often reflected in their understanding of the imago Dei (cf. Gen 1:27).176 Some E/N see the 
image of God as a type of narrative or imaginative template that makes sense of the world, since, 
fundamentally, humans are narratival and thus affective creatures.177 A reductionist account of 
humanity to primarily rational beings “obscure[s] our creation of God in our own image.”178 The 
New Testament develops the idea of conversion and repentance as μετάνοια, i.e. a change of 
mind (cf. Mk. 1:4; Lk. 3:3, 24:47); but this is not merely a change of beliefs or intellect — it is a 
change in affections, desires, and will.179 The mind is first fundamentally reoriented, and then it 
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sanctification helps transform humanity by participation in the imago Christi empowered by the Spirit. See 
Wolfgang Vondey, Pentecostal Theology: Living the Full Gospel (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2017), 175–
197, esp. 180–183. 
177 McGrath, Narrative Apologetics, 45–48. 
178 Merold Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Critique of Reason and Society (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1987), 
24; quoted in Penner, The End of Apologetics, 163.  




continually matures and is transformed (cf. Phil. 1:16, 2:1-2, 5; Rom. 12:2).180 The 
transformation and reorientation of one’s mind should not be taken lightly, as this is a significant 
demand, and the apologist’s approach should honor this.181 Since conversion involves the 
intellectual, moral, emotional, aesthetic, spiritual, physical, and relational realms, apologetic 
method should reflect all of these areas. For Paul, salvation “depended on affectively and 
imaginatively absorbing a story—and seeing [oneself] within that story.”182 Since the Spirit 
alone converts (cf. 1 Cor. 3:5-7; Jn. 3:3-5), the role of humanity is simply to bear witness 
through their living and proclamation of the gospel, and to aid others in moving toward full 
conversion and maturity (which, of course, will not be complete until the eschaton).183 
Persuasion, reason, and witness, in this way, can rightly work together and not be harmful, but 
require a community of like-minded individuals.184 This approach also must be done in a person- 
or audience-sensitive way.185 “I have become all things to all people,” Paul testifies, “so that by 
all possible means I might save some” (1 Cor. 9:22 NIV).  
A few assumptions differentiate E/N approaches. First, the primary goal of apologetics is to 
demonstrate that one should commit their life to Jesus.186 Whether or not this is towards an initial 
 
180 Stackhouse Jr, 74.  
181 William Placher, Unapologetic Theology: A Christian Voice in a Pluralistic Conversation (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1989), 149; quoted in Penner, The End of Apologetics, 161.  
182 Smith, “Pentecostalism,” 606–618, 615. 
183 Stackhouse Jr., Humble Apologetics, 83.  
184 Penner, The End of Apologetics, 164–165. 
185 Stackhouse Jr., Humble Apologetics, 144–145. 




conversion or a maturation, this is the preeminent aim for E/N approaches.187 Second, this 
approach sees humans as primarily desiring or loving beings. Like presuppositionalism, E/N 
emphasizes a person’s pre-rational presumptions that shape their world and interpretation. 
However, E/N pushes this notion further, as beliefs and presuppositions are founded on what one 
desires or loves.188 This amounts to an embodied, affective, and narrative anthropology. This is 
why the goal is conversion. Truth must be embodied and to change one’s mind requires a 
reorientation of desire, love, will, and affections. These factors determine beliefs and affects 
reason. 
 
Summary & Conclusion 
This chapter began with an exploration of various taxonomies for apologetic methodologies. The 
methods were then further organized, as appropriate, into categories that shared the same general 
approach. From this list, three were selected for further analysis based mainly on recognition and 
utility in contemporary settings: presuppositionalism, traditional apologetics, and 
experiential/narratival apologetics. Each view provided a unique perspective on apologetic 
approach and methodology. Presuppositionalism argues that the Christian God is a necessary 
presupposition — the only way to make sense of the world.  Traditional apologetics utilizes 
arguments and evidences towards a rational case for the Christian God. Experiential/Narratival 
apologetics emphasizes that truth is embodied and lived, and thus, their approach reflects witness 
and a focus on experience and narrativity. 
 
187 Stackhouse Jr., Humble Apologetics, 67. Also, McGrath, Narrative Apologetics, 18. Also, Clark, Dialogical 
Apologetics, 122–123. 




Each approach’s view of humanity directly correlates to their method and aim of 
apologetics. The anthropological model and chief task of apologetics separate these three 
categories. Traditional apologetics, with more optimism towards the reliability of reason, 
strategically focuses on humans as rational beings. Their primary aim is to defend Christianity’s 
rationality. Presuppositionalism, highlighting the pre-rational beliefs of humans, views humans 
as believing beings. Their primary aim is to show that Christian belief is true since it needs to be 
presupposed for truth. Experiential/Narratival apologetics, which promotes a holistic picture of 
humanity and truth as necessarily embodied, regards humans as desiring beings. Thus, their aim 
is conversion — an invitation to follow Christ and live the truth. Although any generalizations of 
apologetic approaches risk misunderstandings, the specific methods articulated in this chapter 
reflect these anthropological models and goals primarily in practice. Certainly, traditional 
apologists would like to show Christianity as true and for people to come to Christ. However, 
their chief aim represented through their method reflects the goal of the rationality of 
Christianity. Similarly, they may even personally view humans as more than simply rational 
beings — yet their method(s) do not primarily reflect this. The next chapter will attempt to 
develop an interdisciplinary “portrait” of a human to compare with the three models assumed by 






THE HUMAN PERSON: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PORTRAIT 
Introduction  
“What are human beings that you care for them,” David asks the Lord, “mere mortals that you 
think of them” (Ps. 144:3 NIV)? Despite the thousands of years difference, this question is still 
presently asked in a variety of ways. Many of the prevailing theological issues today are 
anthropological, whether racism, evolution, ableism, gender — or apologetics. An inaccurate 
perception of humanity may breed disaster. Improper anthropological perceptions have led to 
oppression, exclusion, violence, value hierarchies, and countless other sins. A well-informed 
anthropology produces and benefits an apologetic method, whereas a misinformed or reductive 
anthropology negatively affects the health and effectiveness of apologetics.  
This chapter aims to provide an anthropology informed by theology, the social sciences, 
and neuroscience. specifically focusing on human origin, the human condition (and solution), the 
mission and purpose of humanity, ontology and epistemology, and the end or destiny of 
humanity for apologetic purposes.1 Therefore, many anthropological issues, such as human 
freedom, racism, ableism, evolution, gender, and sexuality will not be directly engaged — even 
if there may be indirect inferences.2 At the end of the chapter, the resulting implications for 
apologetics will be outlined and contrasted to James K.A. Smith’s three anthropological models.  
 
1 Although Christian anthropology is grounded in and filtered through Scripture and theology, the sciences can 
supplant and nuance this information, as will be seen later in the chapter. These fields offer unique perspectives that 
are often considered in discussions of anthropological issues.  
2 For a closer look at some of these issues, see Hans Schwarz, The Human Being: A Theological Anthropology 





The challenge of constructing a theological anthropology is multifold. First, the task is inevitably 
complex, since it interacts with soteriology, Christology, eschatology, hamartiology, 
epistemology, and many other theological fields of study. Second, much of the task is already 
shaped by the priority given to different anthropological questions and the assumptions usually 
imported into the biblical text.3 For example, the ambiguity of the imago Dei in Genesis is 
attributed a variety of qualities, such as reason, usually reflecting one’s own anthropological 
assumptions.4 Third, which sources are given precedence is up for debate, usually through the 
primeval history of Genesis, Pauline literature, and the person of Christ.5 Thus, the following 
sections will attempt a tripartite approach to theological anthropology, consisting of the early 
Genesis narratives, Christology, and Pauline literature for a more holistic and balanced account. 
This anthropological study will focus on human origin, the human condition (and solution), the 
mission and purpose of humanity, ontology and epistemology, and the end or destiny of 
humanity — all relating to Smith’s three anthropological models and any implications for 




Grover: Intervarsity Press, 1997); or Susan A. Ross, Anthropology: Seeking Light and Beauty (Collegeville: 
Liturgical Press, 2012).  
3 Ian A. McFarland, Difference & Identity: A Theological Anthropology (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 2001), 2.   
4 John F. Kilner, Dignity and Destiny: Humanity in the Image of God (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing, 2015), 146–175, esp. 146–153. 




I. The Image of God: Eden & Afterward 
The two creation narratives in Genesis ground a theological anthropology, answering questions 
of human origin, condition, purpose, and destiny.6 The first humans are created by God in God’s 
image and likeness (Gen 1:26–27). At the risk of stating the obvious, humans are created as 
contingent, diverse, and transient beings.7 The Creator has formed his creation ex nihilo, i.e. out 
of nothing, and creation is utterly dependent, or contingent, upon God (cf. Gen. 1:1; Heb. 11:3; 
Rev. 4:11). Humans are finite, with a beginning and (earthly) end in a particular place and time 
(cf. Acts 17:26). Knowledge and human judgments, then, are necessarily contingent on personal 
circumstances.8 Diversity pervades the creation, and not only in biological sex. Each human is 
made in the image of God, but this image is recognized and embodied in different ways (cf. Gen. 
1:26–27).9 These characteristics are not defects since humans are created good (Gen 1:31).10 
Over the centuries, various understandings have been attributed to the image of God that humans 
bear, usually controversially argued in one of three ways: (1) as a quality, e.g. reason, love, or 
language; (2) as a duty, e.g. propagation and dominion, or (3) as a relationship.11 Regardless, the 
 
6 Several scholars note two separate creation stories in Genesis: 1:1–2:4 and 2:4–2:25. Which story includes 2:4 is a 
matter of controversy. They provide different diction, style/genre, and accounts of the order of creation. Although 
this may seem problematic in “literal” readings of the text, the narratives provide theological truths regardless. See 
Sandra L. Richter, The Epic of Eden: A Christian Entry into the Old Testament (Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 
2008), 93–95. 
7 Ian A. McFarland, The Word Made Flesh: A Theology of the Incarnation (Louisville: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2019), 43–67. 
8 McFarland, 65.  
9 McFarland, 54. 
10 McFarland, 66.  
11 Bernd Oberdorfer, “The Dignity of Human Personhood and the Concept of the ‘Image of God’” in The Depth of 
the Human Person: A Multidisciplinary Approach, ed. Michael Welker (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing, 2014), 265–270. As Oberdorfer describes, all these views can be heavily critiqued — and for good 




Hebrew word for “image” has a standard ancient Near Eastern meaning akin to “idol” which 
entailed earthly representation of deities; in other words, humans are supposed to be 
representatives of God on earth — whether that’s through qualities, duties, relationships, or 
something different altogether.12 At the very least, the image of God is about connection to God 
and a reflection of him.13  
Humans are also created as necessarily embodied (Gen. 2:4–7). God “breathed life into 
human bodies, bodies created by God, indicating God’s view of the body... it is good because 
God formed it with God’s own hands” (cf. Gen. 2:7).14 Furthermore, both creation narratives 
point to the relationality of humanity (cf. Gen 2:18–25). The first creation narrative portrays both 
male and female as being created together (cf. Gen 1:27). In the second creation narrative, when 
man is first created without woman, his life is neither good nor complete (cf. Gen 2:18) — not 
until another is also created.15 Humans are made for fellowship. No human exists in isolation, 
divorced from God, creation, or each other.16  
The narrative then takes a tragic turn: Adam and Eve eat of the tree of the knowledge of 
good and evil and disobey God (cf. Gen. 3:6). The serpent tempted Eve with a new vision: she 
will not die, will be like God, and will know good and evil (cf. Gen. 3:4–5). Their sin is usually 
perceived as human pride and a desire for self-sufficiency or autonomy — a desire to be like 
 
place the New Testament use of the image of God, which provides a Christological, eschatological, and formational 
focus. This will be discussed further in the following sections.   
12 Richter, The Epic of Eden, 107–108.  
13 Kilner, Dignity and Destiny, 175–177.  
14 Miguel A. De La Torre, Genesis, Belief (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2011), 44. 
15 Paul R. House, Old Testament Theology (Downers Grover: IVP Academic, 2018), 62.  




God.17 However, if Eve did not know of good and evil when she sinned, the implication is that 
sin began as (and may still be) a misguided good or desire.18 Eve, for example, saw the serpent’s 
vision (i.e. the fruit of the tree) — the misguided good — and found it “desirable” (Gen 3:6). The 
tension between the desire to be loved and the desire to be self-sufficient is a common theme in 
the biblical narratives.19 Although their sin prompts shame and hiding from God (cf. Gen 2:25; 
3:8), God calls out (cf. Gen 3:9) and covers them with a sacrifice (cf. 3:21).20 Their sin results 
not only in a reversal of blessings, but also in the relational effects of the Fall — to God, 
creation, and others. They feel shame with each other and God, and the ground and creation 
becomes cursed (cf. Gen 3:14–19). This is the first of many rebellions or “falls” — for after 
Genesis 3 no human avoids sin; it is a continuing pattern throughout history.21  
The creation narratives propose an answer to the question “why do I exist?” Humans were 
created “to live in and attend to paradise” (Gen. 1:28–30; 2:8–17); this arguably includes many 
types of labor and creative work today.22 God planned “a perfect world in which [humans] would 
live eternally, stretching their cognitive and creative skills to the uttermost, building their 
 
17 Torre, 75–76.  
18 William McDavid, Eden and Afterward: A Mockingbird Guide to Genesis (Charlottesville: Mockingbird 
Ministries, 2014), 17. This idea can also be traced as far back as Augustine, as McDavid notes.  
19 McDavid, 19. 
20 Torre, Genesis, 78. When covering their shame with the skin of an animal, he foreshadows the future redemption 
to come. God stated eating of the tree would lead to death (2:17) — yet they lived a long time after. This could 
allude to a spiritual death, then, or perhaps they were somehow saved from death by God.  
21 House, Old Testament Theology, 66–67. John Steinbeck, in his novel East of Eden, beautifully portrays the 
pervasiveness of sin. He traces through multiple generations of characters reflecting the Cain and Abel narrative, 
falling into evil as if it is destiny. At the end of the novel, Cal (a type of Cain) is freed by the Hebrew word timshel 
[sic], translated “thou mayest,” which allows him to overcome his family legacy of sin through seeing it as a choice 
and not a destiny. See John Steinbeck, East of Eden, Centennial Edition (London: Penguin Books, 2002). For the 
four rebellions in Genesis 1–11, see Torre, Genesis, 64–138.  




civilization within the protective boundaries of their relationship with him.”23 Although sin and 
misguided desire supposedly mess up God’s original intent for humanity, redemption history 
reveals God’s “final” plan is leading humans to New Jerusalem — it is God’s original plan all 
along (cf. Rev. 21–22).24 God is “making all things new” (cf. Rev. 21:5) — a (re)creation not ex 
nihilo, but ex materia. The rest of Scripture addresses the sin problem.25 As Sandra Richter 
illuminates, “God has been leading humanity back to Eden by means of a sequence of steps, a 
series of rescues, a series of covenants.”26 This is the grand story of God and humanity. How will 
humanity return to Eden? How will sin be dealt with? How can humanity once more reside in 
God’s presence? Through Jesus Christ alone. 
 
II. The Perfect Image of God: Christ(ology) 
Christology often clarifies other areas of theology, and perhaps anthropology especially. Jesus 
Christ is the true man (cf. Jn. 19–20), the second Adam (cf. 1 Cor. 15), the perfect image of God 
(cf. 2. Cor 4:4; Col 1:15), and the quintessential exemplar for humanity (cf. Heb. 1–2).27 All 
other humans reflect the image of God to the degree of their likeness to Christ (cf. Rom. 8:29; 1 
Cor. 15:49).28 Christ is not just any model of faith (cf. Heb. 11); he reveals what it means to be 
 
23 Richter, The Epic of Eden, 118. 
24 Richter, 129–134. 
25 House, Old Testament Theology, 67. 
26 Richter, The Epic of Eden, 130. 
27 Marc Cortez, Resourcing Theological Anthropology: A Constructive Account of Humanity in the Light of Christ 
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2017), 169. Also see Nonna Verna Harrison, God’s Many-Splendored Image: 
Theological Anthropology for Christian Formation (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010), 30–37. 
28 Marc Cortez, Christological Anthropology in Historical Perspective: Ancient and Contemporary Approaches to 




truly human; he is not only fully human, but perfectly human (cf. Heb. 5:5–10).29 If this is true, 
then embodiment and relationality should be affirmed as essential to humanity.30 This may be 
particularly evident in the synoptic gospel’s holistic soteriology — a transformation of the 
totality of a person.31 Consistently, healing is not merely spiritual or even mental, but also 
physical and relational (cf. Matt. 8:1–4, 9:2–13, 27–31; Lk. 8:42–48). Jesus heals the body, but 
also restores people to their family and community since they would often be considered 
unclean, and further reveals the universality of salvation (cf. Mark 5:21–43).32 More so, Jesus’ 
resurrection reveals an embodied Jesus (cf. Lk. 21; Ac. 2:25-31, 10:40–42) and the description of 
New Jerusalem is one embodied on earth (cf. Rev. 21–22). However, a theological anthropology 
is not complete without acknowledging the Spirit who empowers him, the Father who sends him, 
and his relation within the Trinity.33 
The hypostatic union, i.e. Christ’s dual human and divine natures, explains the relation and 
distinction between God and humanity. Maximus the Confessor, a seventh-century theologian, 
engages the language of Logos and logoi to discuss this correlation. Ian McFarland recapitulates 
his idea: 
 
29 Brian L. McCormack, “’With Loud Cries and Tears’: The Humanity of the Son in the Epistle to the Hebrews” in 
The Epistle to the Hebrews and Christian Theology, eds. Richard Bauckham et al. (Grand Rapids: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing, 2009), 37–68, esp. 62–67. Also see Cortez, Resourcing Theological Anthropology, 171–172. 
30 Cortez, Resourcing Theological Anthropology, 194. 
31 Joel B. Green, “Restoring the Human Person: New Testament Voices for a Wholistic and Social Anthropology” in 
Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, eds. Robert John Russell et al. (Vatican City 
State: Vatican Observatory Publications, 2002), 3–22. 
32 William C. Placher, Mark, Belief (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2010), 82–88. 
33 Cortez, Resourcing Theological Anthropology, 186–187. Also see John Zizioulas for his trinitarian anthropology 
in Cortez, Christological Anthropology in Historical Perspective, 163–189. For a further discussion of the 
anthropological implications of pneumatology, see Lisa P. Stephenson, Dismantling the Dualisms for American 




“God, the Logos, seeks to share the divine goodness with that which is not God, and so 
doing refracts the richness of the divine life through myriad nondivine forms, the logoi 
of individual creatures, each of which displays some aspect of the undivided fullness of 
humanity... Logos has a broad array of meanings. It can be translated ‘word,’ ‘speech,’ 
and ‘reason’... however, I suggest that ‘story’ is a particularly appropriate rendering.”34 
 
The Creator (Logos) becomes creation (a logos among logoi) so that God may be known.35 
Certainly, Jesus is different than other humans. Not only was he born a particular human with an 
ethnicity, gender, culture, etc., but he was also sinless and God.36 Jesus is not different through 
the lack of a human nature (logos), but rather through the way his humanity is realized (tropos).37 
In Jesus’ humanity, he lived dependent upon the Father as Son, hence the logos of humanity 
remains.38 Jesus is fully human. Yet, his humanity is lived “filially” — in a way concordant with 
the Word’s way of being God.39 This explains how Jesus can be fully divine and fully human: he 
shares every condition of humanness, yet lives in a way consistent to the Logos’ manner of 
existence, thus he transcends “normal” humanness through genuinely finite action. Jesus’ story 
perfectly reflects the eternal mutual love represented in the Trinity; similarly, each human’s own 
story attests to and is subsumed and sustained by the Logos — the Story.40 
 
34 McFarland, The Word Made Flesh, 65.  
35 McFarland, 66–67. 
36 Cortez, Resourcing Theological Anthropology, 183–184. 
37 Rowan Williams, Christ: The Heart of Creation (Bedford Square, London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2018), 
101–102.  
38 Williams, 101.  
39 To clarify, Williams states: “this human nature is identified ultimately and decisively by the fact that it actualizes 
divine filiation. Its mode or manner of subsisting is to be ‘filial’ as the Word is ‘filial’, to be absolutely, 
uninterruptedly, consciously and thankfully dependent upon the self-gift of the Father in such a way that the fullness 
of that giving life is lived in the one who receives it.” Williams, 102–103.  




The hypostatic union reveals at least two major anthropological implications. First, the telos, 
or ultimate end, of humanity is to “be aligned with its own natural logos but also for it to exist in 
optimal relation with the Logos”; this is what it means to be fully human.41 In other words, the 
ultimate goal of humanity is to actualize the Word’s loving dependence on the Father in one’s 
own finite life. This is exactly what separates Jesus from the rest of humanity — Jesus fulfills 
this end through the tropos of filial relation, i.e. utter dependence and love for the Father.42 Since 
each logos expresses and reflects God uniquely in a finite form, the diversity of the logoi more 
fully reflect the eternal Logos — at least to the degree that they act as they should.43 Second, 
human self-emptying (kenosis) and self-transcending (ekstasis) can only be realized because of 
one’s alignment with Jesus’ humanity as his sacramental Body.44 The Incarnation made this end, 
i.e. transformation via kenosis and ekstasis, possible through unification with the incarnate 
Logos. Rowan Williams further describes Maximus’ ekstasis as the proper telos of humanity:  
“it is the condition in which the knowing finite subject goes beyond its given limits, 
including the ‘natural’ limits of self-preservation: it is generated by erōs, [i.e.] the 
magnetic drawing of finite beings towards the infinite. For Christ to live in the believer 
is for the believer to be caught up into the self-abandoning love both of the Son for the 
Father and of God for Creation... What God brings about in the finite is a movement of 
‘desire’, erōs — that is, a moving beyond what the intellect can master and a growth in 
love. But this growth in love manifests itself also as an overcoming of ‘the divisions 
now prevailing in nature because of man’s self-love: the community of finite agents 
becomes more and more solidly established in ‘justice’ as human beings recognize 
more fully in one another their common nature as rational. Paradoxically, universal 
rationality here means the universal realization of ‘ecstasy’ acting in other-directed 
love for all in their diverse conditions, so that believers ‘[belong] not to themselves but 
to those whom they love.’”45 
 
41 Williams, Christ, 104. See also McFarland, The Word Made Flesh, 204–206.  
42 Williams, 104.  
43 Williams.  
44 Williams, 106–107.  





This divine way of living is the telos of humanity. As human desire for the infinite grows, the 
more he/she will reflect divine filiation through kenosis and ekstasis. Augustine similarly 
espouses that human willing follows desire.46 Hence, humans sin because of their inadequate 
recognition of God’s perfect goodness and beauty; they cannot not sin unless their desires are 
oriented to the good.47 Jesus, of course, perfectly sees and desires God’s goodness and beauty, so 
he is without sin — and it is because of him through the Spirit that humans can achieve this.48 
This is the telos that humanity anticipates, and which explains the lack of sin in glory. Jesus 
alone has reached this telos; humanity’s reflection of God is commensurate to the degree their 
desire is properly oriented. In the culmination of this desire, the image of God within a person is 
fully realized and one’s life reflects the divine community.49 The divine became fully human, so 
humans, too, can become fully human. Although Jesus’ physical body is no longer here, the 
Body of Christ — the Church — mediates his presence here on earth.50 That God became fully 
human, suffered and died on the cross, resurrected, and brings salvation is the heart of the gospel 




46 McFarland, The Word Made Flesh, 134. 
47 McFarland.  
48 McFarland, 134, 204–211. 
49 Williams, Christ, 108. 
50 McFarland, The Word Made Flesh, 197–198. For further reflections and nuances on the Church as Christ’s body, 




III. The Present Image(s) of God: Paul & Participation 
Paul’s writings further illuminate the anthropological condition, mission, and destiny — 
specifically through his soteriology. All of humanity has “fallen short of the glory of God” and 
thus are “under the power of sin,” “ungodly and unrighteous,” and have “darkened minds” (cf. 
Rom. 1:18–3:23); humans do not live how they are intended to, and thus their destiny, or telos, is 
also not what is intended. Sinful humanity needs a radical reorientation — nothing less than 
salvation.51 For Paul, Jesus Christ provided a way of salvation for all people through his death 
and resurrection (cf. Rom. 1:16) God’s mission on earth is to bring salvation to the world — the 
whole cosmos, even (cf. Rom. 1:16; 8:18–25).52 However, this salvation is not received through 
beliefs in a set of propositions or any type of intellectual assent; rather, for Paul it is through full 
participation in the gospel, “a comprehensive transformation of conviction, character, and 
communal affiliation” (cf. 2 Cor. 5:14–17).53 Michael Gorman emphasizes that participating in 
Christ “is both to benefit from God’s mission of liberation and reconciliation and to bear witness 
to this divine mission — thus furthering it — by becoming a faithful embodiment of it.”54  
 
51 Michael J. Gorman, Becoming the Gospel: Paul, Participation, and Mission (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 2015), 274–277. 
52 Gorman, 12.  
53 Gorman, 23–24. For another scholar who largely agrees with Gorman’s interpretation of Paul, see Susan Grove 
Eastman, Paul and the Person: Reframing Paul’s Anthropology (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 
2017), 109–185.  
54 Gorman, 36. Gorman derives this idea through an extensive analysis of Pauline theology and diction. Seven 
features lead to his summary: (1) language of baptism, (2) parallel language about faith and justification, (3) 
language of being ‘in Christ’ and Christ being within, (4) language of being clothed with Christ, (5) the language of 
sharing, koinōnia, (6) the language of transformation for those in Christ, and (7) the language of sharing in various 
aspects of Christ’s story that are expressed in the Greek prefix syn- (English ‘co-’). For a further examination of 




Paul calls people to become the gospel; being, doing, and telling the gospel.55 This 
participation is a present condition, a mission, and a future end for humanity in Christ. The 
Church through the Spirit, both individually and communally, presently participate in the divine 
as they reflect the image of God on earth. Paul presents several examples of how this present 
holiness occurs: through embodying faith, hope, and love (cf. 1 Thess. 1:3; 5:8, 23); through 
peacemaking and reconciliation (cf. Eph. 4:3); through hope and patience in suffering (cf. Rom. 
12:2); and through humility and gentleness (cf. Eph. 4:2; Rom. 12:16; Phil. 2:2–4). Succinctly, 
believers “wear” Jesus (cf. Rom. 13:14; Eph. 6:10–22) and re-narrate his story through word and 
deed.56 As they participate in the missio Dei and embody the imago Dei, viz. as they become 
more Christ-like, they reverse the consequences of the first man, Adam (cf. Rom. 1–2).  
This participation and transformation is not just temporal and ethical, it is eschatological and 
ontological.57 The ultimate telos of humanity is the “freedom of the glory of the children of God” 
(Rom. 8:21) and conformity to the Son (Rom. 8:29).58 All of this is solely possible because of 
Christ through the Spirit who empowers believers to participate in and embody the gospel, thus 
being a witness to the world (cf. 8:9–17).59 Although a shallow reading of Paul may see the body 
as evil or unnecessary, Paul’s anthropology is more complex and counters both these 
 
55 Gorman, 44.  
56 Gorman, 72, 116, 289–290. The narrative or story is one not only to be announced and proclaimed, but lived and 
performed — embodied. Gorman sees the “master story” as represented in Phil. 2:6–11, see 106–141. 
57 Gorman, 282.  
58 Gorman, 281.  




reductionistic notions; embodiment is good when one’s desires are rightly oriented, since “those 
who belong to Christ Jesus have crucified the flesh with its passions and desires” (Gal. 5:24).60  
This spirit-empowered witness through word and deed, or gospel embodiment, is a defense 
(apologia) and confirmation of the faith (cf. Phil. 1:7).61 This apologia is often a response to the 
suffering and persecution believers experience.62 Yet defense is not only reactionary but 
proactive, involving peacemaking and loving one’s enemies (cf. Rom. 12:17–21).63 A similar 
exhortation occurs in 1 Peter 3:13–17 (ESV), 
“Now who is there to harm you if you are zealous for what is good? But even if you 
should suffer for righteousness’ sake, you will be blessed. Have no fear of them, nor be 
troubled, but in your hearts honor Christ the Lord as holy, always being prepared to 
make a defense (apologia) to anyone who asks you for a reason (logos) for the hope 
that is in you; yet do it with gentleness and respect, having a good conscience, so that, 
when you are slandered, those who revile your good behavior in Christ may be put to 
shame. For it is better to suffer for doing good, if that should be God’s will, than for 
doing evil.”64 
 
Although 1 Peter 3:15 is engaged in most apologetical works, it is often divorced from its wider 
context.65 The purpose of 1 Peter is holiness in three forms: (1) personal holiness, (2) social 
holiness, and (3) communal holiness.66 In this passage, the author focuses on doing good amidst 
 
60 Understanding the difference between sarx and soma are essential to Paul’s view. See Michael Welker, “Flesh-
Body-Heart-Soul-Spirit: Paul’s Anthropology as an Interdisciplinary Bridge-Theory” in The Depth of the Human 
Person: A Multidisciplinary Approach, 45–57, esp. 47–49. Also see Gerd Theissen, “Sarx, Soma, and the 
Transformative Pneuma” in The Depth of the Human Person: A Multidisciplinary Approach, 166–185.  
61 Gorman, Becoming the Gospel, 139.  
62 Gorman, 111.  
63 Gorman, 165.  
64 Greek added.  
65 For two examples of this, see: Louis Markos, Apologetics in the 21st Century (Wheaton: Crossway, 2010), 17–18 
and Hunter, Evangelistic Apologetics, 118–122. 
66 Peter H. Davids, The First Epistle of Peter, The New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand 




the evil, suffering, and oppression, emphasizing how believers respond to their persecutors, with 
the implication that their good behavior and obedience (or submission) will make the persecutors 
question and ask about the hope they have.67 The defense is much more about orthopraxy, or 
right action, than presenting a rational case against other belief systems, even if “reason” implies 
a verbal defense as well.68 So for these authors, apologetics, the task of defending the faith, is to 
bear witness to the gospel in word and deed. Of course, this witness may include rational 
arguments or evidences, but it is not essentially that. 
If the defense of the faith is witness in word and deed, then it ineluctably overlaps with 
evangelism.69 Apologetics is inevitably evangelism in the sense that believers’ lives bear witness 
in both word and deed. Defending the faith is a product of becoming the gospel; as they live 
correctly, they bear witness and defend the faith. The only way a “defense” is not witness, is 
when it does not participate in or reflect God — and if that’s the case — believers should not 
engage in it. This obviously (re)defines the relationship between apologetics and evangelism in a 
way discordant with some popular beliefs. This is especially true if evangelism is limited by 
definition to the verbal proclamation of Jesus Christ’s death, burial, and resurrection.70 The most 
common view, especially popular among traditional apologists, is that apologetics is a type of 
“pre-evangelism” or reasoned argumentation separate from proclaiming the gospel.71 The 
 
67 Lewis Donelson, From Hebrews to Revelation: A Theological Introduction (Louisville: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2001), 62–63.  
68 James W. Sire, A Little Primer on Humble Apologetics (Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 2006), 16–17. 
69 Gorman, Becoming the Gospel, 44, 75. 
70 Of course, with this narrow definition of evangelism, apologetics would not overlap entirely. See, for example, 
Hunter, Evangelistic Apologetics, iii.  





rational arguments and evidences are meant to open up a person to hearing the gospel message, 
clearing away intellectual “debris” of sorts. In this system, “evangelism sticks more to the 
emotional than to the rational.”72 Yet this posits a reductionist framework of not only salvation, 
but the gospel itself — at least according to Gorman’s understanding of Paul. Salvation is 
conveyed (and embodied and practiced) through word and deed. Paul challenges the former 
notion and (re)defines the idea of apologetics, although this does not necessarily reject the idea 
of reasoned arguments and evidences within that framework. This revised view is consistent with 
the E/N methodology and their primary aim in apologetics. 
The way defenses are made matter for Paul. For example, Paul compares holiness amidst the 
culture to waging war in 2 Corinthians 10:4–6 (ESV),  
“For though we walk in the flesh, we are not waging war according to the flesh. For 
the weapons of our warfare are not of the flesh but have divine power to destroy 
strongholds. We destroy arguments (logismos) and every loft opinion raised against the 
knowledge of God, and take every thought (noēma) captive to obey Christ, being ready 
to punish every obedience, when your obedience is complete.”  
 
The Roman military imagery contrasts the weapons of Christ against the weapons of the culture, 
including “violent force, sophisticated philosophical logic that wins debates, [and] even displays 
of ecstatic experiences designed to dazzle.”73 Rather, the Church’s loving witness takes every 
mind (noēma) captive through the transformation of enemies into the children of God, thus saved 
from their hardened and blinded noēma (cf. 2 Cor. 3:14; 4:4).74 Furthermore, Paul creatively 
shapes his witness and testimony around his audience. For example, his verbal witness to the 
 
72 Markos, Apologetics in the 21st Century, 20. 
73 Mitzi L. Minor, 2 Corinthians, Smyth & Helwys Bible Commentary (Macon, Georgia: Smyth & Helwys 
Publishing, 2009), 192–193. The Greek logizmos generally referred to philosophical thoughts and reasoning.  
74 Minor, 194–197. The Greek noēma translates as “thought,” “design,” or “mind.” Since it evokes imagery from 




Jews (cf. Acts 2), Greeks (cf. Acts 17), and Romans (cf. Acts 24–26) all uniquely are formed 
around each audience.75 This echoes of Paul’s proclamation, “Yes, I try to find common ground 
with everyone, doing everything I can to save some” (1 Cor. 9:22 NLT). Witness, in word and 
deed, should be creative. 
 
The Sciences 
In recent history, multiple disciplines confirm — or at least reveal intimations of — persons as 
desirers or lovers, including neuroscience, psychology, sociology, and behavioral economics. 
This is mainly revealed by the research in two ways: (1) a rejection of the person-as-thinker 
model, and (2) evidence of persons as more holistic than the other models assert. So, while this 
may not necessarily confirm the entire person-as-desirer model, the research corroborates their 
central claims. Humans are affective, intuitive, narrative, relational, and embodied — these are 
central and essential characteristics to what it means to be human. Humans are also certainly 
thinking beings, but only among other attributes, and it is not as central as some would maintain. 
As the research will show, a person’s “reasoning” is often simply a post-hoc justification of 
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I. The Social Sciences 
Jonathan Haidt, a social psychologist, rejects a Platonic anthropology where reason is not only 
central to the human being, but the master of passions or desires. Rather, he insists that reason is 
(mostly) servant to the passions.76 He employs the metaphor of a rider and an elephant to 
highlight the difference between two types of cognition: reasoning (controlled processes) and 
intuition (automatic processes, including emotion).77 The rider, i.e. reasoning, sees into the future 
to make better decisions, learns new skills, and is a spokesperson for the elephant.78 However, 
the elephant does whatever it pleases — the rider does not guide it — the rider mainly creates 
post hoc justifications or explanations for the elephant’s movements. In other words, intuitions 
deeply guide humans, and most reasoning is simply an after-the-fact justification for what is 
already intuitively known or felt.79 A person’s judgments and reasoning can often persuade 
others’ intuition, especially in the context of a friendly relationship or affective narrative, since 
social influence substantially affects humans.80 Of course, one’s own intuitions or judgments 
may be changed via the rider through private reflection and reasoned judgment, but this is rarely 
the case.81 Haidt lists six key research findings that together reinforce this metaphor: (1) affective 
primacy, viz. intuition/emotion are processed fast and are more powerful than thinking; (2) social 
and political judgments depend heavily on fast intuitive “flashes”; (3) moral judgments are 
 
76 Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion (New York: Vintage 
Books, 2012), 32–36, 79. 
77 Haidt, 53.  
78 Haidt, 54.  
79 Haidt. 
80 Haidt, 55–57, 79–91.  




affected by taste, smell, and other bodily states; (4) psychopaths reason but lack many emotions, 
and their moral judgments are deficient; (5) conversely, babies feel but lack reasoning, yet have 
the beginnings of moral judgments; and (6) moral judgments are correlated to affective reactions 
in the brain.82 Together these findings reveal that most (moral) judgments are the result of 
intuition and emotion, rather than reasoning.  
The field of Behavioral Economics similarly contests humans as merely “rational” beings. 
Traditional economic theory assumes humans always optimize, i.e. make the most rational (or 
internally consistent) decision, and reason without bias.83 This fictitious optimizing creature is 
referred to as an “Econ.” However, unlike Econs, humans are often found misbehaving: 
decisions are oftentimes too difficult to solve, beliefs are biased, and supposedly irrelevant 
factors greatly influence decisions and beliefs.84 Real humans rarely believe or choose rationally, 
but they are not irrational either — a rational-agent model of humanity is simply not compatible 
with the current research.85 Thus, the field of Behavioral Economics emerged — shifting the 
 
82 If you would like to personally test (2), take the IAT at https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/. Another example of 
(2) is that the outcomes of every presidential election are concordant with research that asked people to make a 
competence judgment between the candidates with only a tenth of a second viewing of their faces. For an example 
of (3), various research showed that judgments were heavily influenced by good or bad smells (the latter resulting in 
harsher judgments) and standing far away from or near a hand sanitizer dispenser (the latter resulting in more 
conservative judgments). For the research and a further explanation of each facet of research, see Haidt, 64–82.  
83 Richard H. Thaler, Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
2015), 4–5. Although even Adam Smith, the “father of modern economic thinking,” disagreed with this view of 
humanity. He even wrote much on human “passions.” See Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments; and 
Thaler, 7.  
84 Thaler, 6–9.  
85 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011), 411. Amos Tversky 
and Kahneman, often seen as the founders of behavioral economics, are often repulsed when their work is used to 
“prove” that people are irrational. People are neither rational nor irrational, at least in economist definitions. Human 
cognitive faculties do not allow for pure rationality — it is impossible. Humans can still make reasoned and rational 
decisions, although people usually need help making correct judgments and decisions. For a history of Tversky and 
Kahneman, see Michael Lewis, The Undoing Project: A Friendship That Changed Our Minds (New York: W.W. 




object of economic theory from Econs to real people who err, in order to improve accuracy of 
predictions. Humans are biased or misbehave in several ways: loss aversion, a bias towards 
avoiding losses rather than making profits; framing, a bias from how information is presented; 
anchoring, a bias towards recently encountered information; confirmation bias, seeking evidence 
for pre-existing beliefs; the halo effect, when feelings towards unrelated data impacts belief or 
judgment; hindsight bias, a post-hoc belief that an outcome was predicted or considered very 
likely; and the endowment effect, where a possessed item is valued more than the same non-
possessed object.86 Daniel Kahneman describes two cognitive “systems.” System 1 is automatic 
and creates quick judgments involving intuitions, impressions, and emotions; while it is the 
origin of many biases and wrongful judgments, most of the time System 1 is correct.87 System 2 
is slow, deliberate, and detailed — often “associated with the subjective experiences of agency, 
choice, and concentration.”88 Although System 2 often improves performance and takes over 
when System 1 is in trouble, it usually rationalizes and forms beliefs from the decisions in 
System 1 and is also prone to error due to its own limits.89 Thus, in order to persuade a person, 
an appeal to System 1 is usually most effective.90 Kahneman’s dual-system thinking shares much 
 
86 Kahneman, 79–88, 202–204, 278–299, 363–374. Both Thaler and Kahneman’s works engage the research of these 
effects, among many more, such as availability, representativeness, and the narrative fallacy. For more, also see Dan 
Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 
2008); or Ori Brafman and Rom Brafman, Sway: The Irresistible Pull of Irrational Behavior (New York: The 
Doubleday Publishing Group, 2008). 
87 Kahneman, 20–30, 415–416. 
88 Kahneman, 21.  
89 Kahneman, 21–30, 415.  




commonality with Jonathan Haidt’s metaphor of the elephant and the rider, with similar 
conclusions.91 
But are important decisions, like religious belief, really prone to post hoc rationalizations? 
On top of the prior research, a brief examination of atheists (and nonbelievers in general) may 
point to a similar conclusion. Psychologist Paul Vitz found that a majority of history’s most 
famous and outspoken atheists had absent or dysfunctional fathers between the ages of three and 
five, e.g. Nietzsche, Hume, Russell, Sartre, Camus, Freud, and Wells.92 (Interestingly, Derek was 
two years old when our father left.) Conversely, the opposite was true with famous theists. 
Although he rejects this correlation will be true in all cases, as he gives examples of, he reveals a 
trend. He concludes that many atheists likely reject God for subconscious reasons, and not from 
reason or evidence primarily.93 Demographic research conducted by the Barna Group 
interestingly supplants Vitz’ familial theme: the outreach effort most likely to appeal to Skeptics 
(i.e. self-proclaimed atheists and agnostics) is learning “that the church has older adults who 
provide life lessons and advice to younger adults”; whereas this ranked much lower for the non-
Skeptic nonbeliever.94 While any direct causation is contestable, the correlation at least points to 
the likelihood of pre-rational factors of disbelief in some cases. Other research from the Barna 
Group studied non-Christians’ negative perceptions of the faith. Most negative perceptions result 
 
91 Both Haidt and Kahneman note the similarity of the two. For Kahneman’s connection, see Kahneman, 140. For 
Haidt’s connection, see Jonathan Haidt, “Reasons Matter (When Intuitions Don’t Object)”, last modified October 7, 
2012. https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/reasons-matter-when-intuitions-dont-object/.  
92 Paul C. Vitz, Faith of the Fatherless: The Psychology of Atheism, 2nd ed. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2013), 
part one. To Vitz, three years old is when a child becomes less dependent on the mother, whereas five is when social 
relationships soften the blow.  
93 Vitz, part two. 
94 Barna Group, Churchless: Understanding Today’s Unchurched and How to Connect with Them, eds. George 
Barna and David Kinnaman (Carol Stream: Tyndale Momentum, 2016), 148–150. The results were self-reported 




from personal relationships and church experiences, and at least one-fifth of non-Christians — 
and one-third for 16–29-year-olds — note negative experiences with a church or Christian that 
affected their view of Jesus negatively.95 As Kinnaman soberly states, “what people think about 
Christians reflects personal stories.”96 These experiences lead many away not only from other 
Christians, but from the faith. A rejection of Christianity, then, is usually more than simply a 
denial by reason alone, if at all, and may likely be a post hoc judgment based on pre-rational 
factors. Thomas Nagel, another well-known atheist, succinctly articulates this post hoc 
justification: “It isn’t just that I don’t believe in God, and, naturally, hope that I’m right in my 
belief. It’s that I hope there is no God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe 
to be like that.”97 
Sociologist Christian Smith claims that pre-rational beliefs, narratives, and relationships are 
central to what it means to be human. Human lives and knowledge are inevitably founded upon 
assumptions and beliefs that cannot be empirically verified nor proved with certainty.98 Neither 
are these assumptions and beliefs universal — at least in the sense of being present everywhere 
— which is empirically untrue.99 The abortion debate largely exemplifies this: Should a woman 
have freedom to dispose of the baby/mass of tissue? At what point does someone become a 
living human? The answers to these questions are unverifiable since any “evidence,” whether for 
 
95 David Kinnaman and Gabe Lyons, unChristian: What a New Generation Really Thinks about Christianity... And 
Why it Matters (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2007), 30–32. 
96 Kinnaman and Lyons, 38. 
97 Thomas Nagel, The Last Word (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 130; quoted in McGrath, Narrative 
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or against a stance, is understood through one’s basic beliefs and assumptions.100 As Smith notes, 
“the ability of data to prove or disprove a theory is problematic when the data themselves are 
always and profoundly theory-laden.”101 The assumptions and beliefs of individuals, societies, 
and institutions have substantial consequences — and often become so ingrained that they are 
invisible.102 Humankind and culture cannot be properly understood without this understanding. 
Not only are humans believing creatures, but they are narrative creatures who both share and are 
made by stories that orient their lives and convey meaning.103 People hold a variety of both 
personal and “big picture” narratives, which may or may not be consistent with each other.104 
There are also metanarratives, i.e. an all-encompassing story about purpose, origin, nature, the 
destiny of humanity, and moral order which governs and plots all other stories and narratives.105 
Sociologist Roy Baumeister’s research shows that in order for the human quest for meaning to be 
satisfied, people need answers to four questions: (1) Identity: Who am I? (2) Value: Do I Matter? 
(3) Purpose: Why am I here? (4) Agency: Can I make a difference?106 Narratives, of all sizes, 
bring meaning to life and answer these questions to some degree. As Smith argues, people 
“cannot live without stories, big stories finally, to tell us what is real and significant and to know 
 
100 Although the debate is more nuanced than shown above, it cuts to much of the heart of the issues. Christian 
Smith, 50–52. 
101 Smith, 52. 
102 Smith, 58–60. 
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who we are, where we are, what we are doing, and why.”107 Although narratives shape beliefs, 
reason, and interpretation of evidence, people can still be changed and persuaded — in fact it 
happens all the time. Smith’s anthropology (and epistemology) challenges people to be aware of 
their stories and why debates and discussions can be so difficult; the challenge for people today 
is to figure out how to discuss rival narratives, persuade the other, and live together.108 While this 
research critiques the human-as-thinker model, it points towards at least a human-as-believer 
model, if not also the beginnings of a human-as-desirer model.109 Despite the ambiguity, the 
following neuroscience research evidently supports the human-as-desirer model. 
 
II. Neuroscience 
Neuroscience supports the claims that humans are holistic — not only are humans thinking 
beings, but more centrally (or essentially) are emotional, embodied, narrative, and 
relational/social beings. The various research also supports a concept of the human person as 
anti- or post-Cartesian. Antonio Damasio’s profound neuroscience research on the prefrontal 
cortex illuminates the role of emotion in cognition. Patients with damage to their prefrontal 
cortex often become emotionally detached with a severe personality change.110 One patient could 
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understand the appropriate emotions he should have, yet could not feel them, allowing emotion 
to not forcefully affect his reasoning. In a person-as-thinker model, this should have allowed for 
better, and more rational, decisions and judgments — yet the opposite occurred. These patients 
often were unable to make decisions or made foolish ones in their own personal lives — even 
though they retained their IQ and moral understanding of right and wrong. The conclusion is 
simple: emotions, including desires and intuitions, are necessary for proper rational decisions. 
Joseph LeDoux, similarly, sees emotions as central to humanity since they are critical for 
survival, necessarily interconnected to most parts of the brain, and complex — since the brain 
has several different “emotion” systems for different purposes.111  
Humans are also essentially social beings. Marc Jeannerod’s research highlights the intrinsic 
social and communicative nature of humans, and also sheds insights into the philosophical 
problem of other minds. First, Jeannerod reveals that humans naturally have the ability to 
recognize others’ intentions (“mirror neurons”) because the system for detecting intentions, 
beliefs, or actions of others is the same system used for the self. “We can know what people 
think (or believe, or intend),” Jeannerod argues, “because we are able internally to simulate the 
states of their minds.”112 Social communication involves shared simultaneous (though not 
identical) mental states between individuals in order for mutual understanding. Second, the brain 
cannot always recognize the origin of intent — having a neural representation of an intention and 
attributing it to the self are two different processes that aren’t necessarily linked.113 For example, 
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one experiment told subjects to recognize whether hand movements were theirs or the 
experimenters after following movement instructions. In two easy cases, the subjects were 
almost always correct: (1) when the experimenter’s hand did not follow the correct instructions, 
and (2) when they were actually viewing their hand. However, when the experimenter’s hand 
followed the instructions, thirty percent of the time normal subjects misattributed the movements 
to themselves; for Schizophrenics, who tend to incorporate external events into their own 
experience, the percent raised to eighty. Together, these two insights reveal how the brain is 
naturally equipped for social action, and also falsifies “the Cartesian dictum that one knows 
one’s own mind (intentions) directly and indubitably.”114 Leslie Brothers’ research, mainly 
around the role of the amygdala in social function, similarly asserts that human brains are 
equipped for social participation.115 More so, both congenitally blind (i.e. patients born blind) 
and deafferentiated patients (i.e. those who have lost vision, and touch and bodily awareness 
from the neck down) gesture in conversations, hinting that part of being human is essentially the 
relationships with others, further giving evidence for human intersubjectivity.116 
Humans are also essentially embodied. The research of both Marc Jeannerod and Michael 
Arbib explore the action-oriented nature of human cognition. For example, Jeannerod cites 
studies that show how mentally imagining or simulating action leads to direct activation of the 
motor system; in other words, thinking of an action resembles intentionally executing an 
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action.117 Thus, he shares neurophysiological evidence of the moral dictum “to intend is to 
act.”118 Arbib asserts that perception is an action-oriented restructuring of the world rather than a 
passive reception of data, and that several types of mental events are dependent on various 
physiological processes.119 Arbib’s research supports “a pragmatic as opposed to a contemplative 
approach to epistemology.”120 Shaun Gallagher also cites evidence for this connection. First, 
neonates imitate facial expressions of others as soon as a few minutes after birth — long before 
language or abstract thought develops. Not only does this reveal an essential relational aspect of 
humanity, but also that even before newborns attain a theory of the mind, they already have an 
embodied understanding of other people.121 Thus, human developmental research rejects people 
as disembedded from other minds and minds in general as disembodied.122 
The diversity of neuroscientists also points to humans as essentially narrative creatures. This is 
particularly evident when it comes to episodic memory. Lesions in the hippocampus can severely 
impact episodic memory — the “narrative” memory that gives context to experiences and a 
continued sense of identity.123 Alzheimer’s patients, or any patients with severe loss of memory, 
reveal the devastating effects of not being able to construct new narratives.124 Without being able 
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to form memory narrativally, every event would be new, thus inhibiting identity (re)formation 
and experiencing the present.125 Similarly, Damasio also notes that construction of a narrative, 
including personal memories and intentions, is essential for any type of continuity of identity and 
consciousness.126 This narrative is not simply a recollection of past events, however; it is actively 
reconstructed and influenced by re-interpreted past events, future goals and plans, and narratives 
in culture, religion, and so on.127 Narratives, both personal and communal, are vital to what it 
means to be human, survive, and have an identity. 
 
Summary & Conclusion 
This interdisciplinary approach to anthropology paints a more holistic picture of humanity than 
either of the person-as-thinker or person-as-believer models portray. Theological anthropology 
hints at a person-as-desirer model through the explanation of sin and the human condition as 
misguided desire, the mission/purpose of humanity as participating in the gospel through creative 
witness in word and deed, salvation as seen as including more than just mental or spiritual 
aspects, and how the ultimate telos of humanity is achieved through perfectly reorienting desire 
and love. The social sciences and neuroscience support the notion of humans as essentially 
affective, communal/relational, narrative, and embodied, alongside believing and thinking. 
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Reasoning is never neutral, but necessarily affected by pre-rational factors of belief that reason 
tends to justify post hoc. This anthropological “portrait” points to three apologetic implications 
that should be considered alongside the larger work of E/N proponents: (1) apologetics is (and 
should be) about more than simply logical and rational arguments, (2) apologetics should take a 





APOLOGETIC REFLECTIONS: PERSUASION, CREATIVITY, COMMUNITY 
Introduction  
In Douglas Wilson’s allegory Persuasions, Wilson describes the Road that runs in two 
directions: eastward with a gradual incline that leads to the City, and westward towards the 
Abyss.1 Many were headed down the wrong path towards the Abyss, but it was not always 
evident since it winds through various canyons. The Master of the City displayed signposts 
warning travelers of the dangers and instructed his servants to try to persuade the travelers in the 
reverse direction. Those quite skilled at the endeavor learned to answer each traveler according 
to their own objections and personal situations. Of course, this is the situation apologists (and all 
Christians) find themselves in. How can we best lead them to the city?  
Different anthropological models lead to different answers. As the prior chapter concludes, 
the person-as-desirer model fits best with the interdisciplinary anthropological research. The 
resulting three apologetic implications can be succinctly rewritten in three dichotomies: (1) 
persuasion over argumentation, (2) creativity over rigidity, and (3) community over 
individuality.2 If apologetics is more than simply logical and rational argumentation, then it 
involves persuasion. If apologetics should be creative, it resists overly rigid approaches. If 
apologetics is the task of the Church, and humans are social beings, then it involves community, 
not just individuals. Each of these dichotomies should be understood in that the latter is 
 
1 Douglas Wilson, Persuasions: A Dream of Reason Meeting Unbelief (Moscow, ID: Canon Press, 1997), 7.  
2 Wilson’s allegory illuminates the three dichotomies: the task of the servants (i.e. the Church) is to convince (or 




subsumed by the former. For example, apologetics as persuasion does not omit logical and 
rational argumentation but reveals it as one means of persuasion among many.  
Although the person-as-desirer model fits best, all three of the major apologetic methods are 
valuable for apologetics. For example, hard E/N methodologies tend to omit logical and rational 
argumentation altogether — yet the anthropological research shows this type of reasoning is still 
sometimes effectual, just not as influential as the former models suppose. So, there is a place for 
much of the work of traditional apologists. Similarly, each anthropological model ended in 
different, yet important, apologetic tasks. Defense of the faith, according to the previous chapter, 
can include showing the faith to be rational, showing Christian belief to be true, and witnessing 
to others so they will follow Christ. However, the former two tasks are subsumed by the latter — 
and not always necessary. In other words, defense of the faith is always witnessing so that others 
may follow Christ, and sometimes that includes explicitly showing the Christian faith to be 
rational and/or true. The apologetic task, then, can be accomplished through a variety of means 
of persuasion, yet is context-dependent and fulfilled in light of the larger Church community. 
The rest of the chapter outlines and proposes an eclectic and holistic apologetic approach 





3 In a sense, this approach may be considered an extreme soft E/N approach since it not only allows for the other 
methods and means, but is based on a person-as-desirer anthropological model. The critique and revision of method 
is not aimed primarily at traditional or presuppositional methods, but against hard approaches and faulty or 




Persuasion over Argumentation: Attack the Elephant 
If apologetics is (or should be) characterized by more than logical and rational argumentation, 
then a more accurate term is persuasion.4 Following Jonathan Haidt’s analogy in the previous 
chapter, each person is moved by their elephant and the rider tends to make post hoc 
rationalizations for it. In order to persuade people, the apologist should primarily appeal to, or 
“attack,” the elephant. Apologetics is usually viewed as pre-evangelism, i.e. a clearing of the 
intellectual debris that prevent people from coming to Christ. However, there are many other 
types of “debris” that stymie people from the faith, such as painful personal experiences. The 
debris is often difficult to recognize, yet it drives the elephant that the apologist wants to impact. 
How can apologists attack the elephant? As the next section will show, creativity can lead to 
several unique strategies, but nine particular means (or modes) of persuasion are especially 
relevant to the apologist based on the previous chapter’s research. The first three means of 
persuasion are popularized by Aristotle: logos, ethos, and pathos.5 The following three modes, 
i.e. kairos, mythos, and topos, are sometimes referenced alongside Aristotle’s triad and are 
especially relevant for effective persuasion.6 Lastly, a specifically Christian approach reveals 
 
4 Benno van den Toren agrees with the terminology since persuasion is complex, varied, and includes emotional and 
moral components. Technically, one could argue that argumentation can include those components as well; 
however, this is mainly opposing logical (or rational) argumentation as the only (or main) source of persuasion. See 
Toren, Christian Apologetics as Cross-Cultural Dialogue, 178. 
5 See Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, trans. H.C. Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin Books, 2004), esp. 16–17. 
Although Aristotle popularized these means of persuasion, common usage today tends to slightly drift from his 
views. So, the following articulations of each mode are not necessarily Aristotelian despite being drawn from his 
concepts. 
6 See “Kairos” and “Commonplace” in Jay Heinrichs, Thank You for Arguing: What Aristotle, Lincoln, and Homer 
Simpson Can Teach Us About the Art of Persuasion, 4th ed (New York: Broadway Books, 2020), 419–423. The 
previous chapter also gives credence for persuasion through story (mythos), relevance (topos), and timing or 




tropos, typos, and theos as appropriate means of persuasion for the apologist.7 The nine modes 
may overlap and interact with each other, but they each offer a distinct “tool” for the apologist to 
reflect on. Together these modes shape an appropriate apologetic approach that recognizes the 
holistic nature of each person. The rest of this section will explore the nine means of persuasion 
in the apologetic process.  
The first mode is logos, persuasion by means of logic and coherency.8 The apologist, in this 
mode, seeks to establish the faith as coherent, rational, logical, and/or true. This can be 
accomplished in many ways: rational or logical arguments for theism or the Christian God, 
explanation of the Christian faith, or answers to objections or “defeaters” to Christianity, among 
others. A traditional view of apologetics tends to view this as the sole (or primary) mean of 
persuasion.9 Although the addition of logos may appear inconsistent given the former appeals 
against the primacy of rationalistic thinking, this mode is nonetheless essential. There are many 
people who genuinely view the Christian faith as irrational, illogical, and incoherent — whether 
or not that is the sole reason for disbelief. Logos, by itself, rarely causes people to change their 
views.10 This mode is most effective when among other means of persuasion.  
 
7 The previous chapter notes the importance of the way arguments are made (tropos), gospel embodiment (typos), 
and the role of God in persuasion (theos).  
8 The Greek λόγος can be translated as a “word,” “speech,” “account,” or “reason.” See Maurice A. Robinson and 
Mark A. House, Analytical Lexicon of New Testament Greek: Revised and Updated (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson 
Publishers, 2012), 223.  
9 This is explored in-depth in chapter two.  
10 Evidence for this was explored in chapter three, especially through the research on post hoc justification. Haidt’s 
research revealed that people are more likely to be persuaded, for example, if from a close friend they trust (ethos) 




The second mode is ethos, persuasion by means of character and authority.11 The apologist, 
in this mode, seeks to establish their credentials. Why should a person trust the apologist? Why 
do his/her thoughts matter at all? This mode seeks to answer these questions. People will often 
look to the character, authority, and trustworthiness of the person persuading in order to “verify” 
their claims. The failure of this area results in diminished impact and influence in persuasion.12 
For example, very few today look to Adolf Hitler for moral advice — simply because he is not 
trustworthy in that area. Even if he had something of worth to say, it would quickly be 
overshadowed by the fact that he is not a person who one should be or want to be persuaded by. 
Similarly, the Church is often a hindrance to people in their faith journey, whether deserved or 
not.13 Christians, and by extension Christianity, are often viewed negatively, labeled in America 
as archaic, anti-scientific, immoral (especially regarding sexuality), judgmental, politically 
conservative, hypocritical, insensitive, and so on.14 The apologist should be aware of what a 
person or community assumes of them, so they can work towards building credibility where 
necessary. For example, an apologist combating the notion of Christianity as anti-scientific may 
appeal to their authority as a scientist. There are several other ways this credibility can be built as 
well: living a holy lifestyle above reproach, being lovingly involved in the life of the person or 
 
11 The Greek ἦθος and ἔθος can be translated as a “habit” or “custom.” This root extends to ἠθικός which means 
“character.” See Robinson and House, Analytical Lexicon of New Testament Greek, 101, 106.  
12 A recent example of this is the controversy surrounding Ravi Zacharias International Ministries (RZIM). Dr. Max 
Baker-Hytch, a RZIM apologist, sent a letter to the leaders of the ministry explaining that they have “lost trust 
‘internally and externally’ because of its handling of recent scandals involving its founder.” The tattered reputation 
of both the founder and the ministry has limited their influence as of late. See Julie Roys, “RZIM Apologist Sends 
Stunning Letter: Says Ministry Has Lost Trust & Needs to Make ‘Meaningful Reparations’”, last modified 
December 12, 2020. https://julieroys.com/rzim-apologist-letter-lost-trust-reparations/. 
13 This was notably shown in the previous chapter, especially through the demographic research that personal 
experiences with Christians/church often led to negative perceptions of the faith.  





community, meeting people’s practical needs, or sharing of one’s own personal faith experiences 
that lead to perceived credibility, among others.15 In most cases, a personal relationship with a 
person or community proves most fruitful if the apologist is recognized as trustworthy.16  
The third mode is pathos, persuasion by means of emotions and values.17 The apologist, in 
this mode, seeks to appeal to emotions and values and remove any experiential roadblocks to the 
faith. This is perhaps most foreign to traditional apologists where emotion is contrasted with 
rationality.18 If an idea doesn’t feel right emotionally or intuitively, it will often be rejected 
before being seriously (or rationally) considered.19 The ability to capture the emotions and values 
of an audience can prompt more openness and reception, shift moods and perceptions, and lead 
to an emotional commitment.20 This can be accomplished through diction, tone, analogies, 
humor, surprise, compelling images, storytelling, worship, prayer, sympathy, and a plethora of 
other ways.21 The idea is to point to personal experiences, feelings, and values for 
persuasiveness. However, many people have experiential “debris” that prevents them from 
coming to the faith. Perhaps the most “debris” comes from a person’s (or community’s) painful 
 
15 This is reminiscent of the Apostle Paul’s words: “The only letter of recommendation we need is you yourselves. 
Your lives are a letter written in our hearts; everyone can read it and recognize our good work among you.” (2 Cor. 
3:2 NLT).  
16 Haidt’s research emphasized that people are more likely to be persuaded if from a close friend they trust. See 
Haidt, The Righteous Mind, 55–57, 79–91. Similarly, another study showed that the people most resistant and 
antagonistic to the faith often joined the church due to the “persistence and long-term commitment of a Christian 
toward them” (99). See Rainer, The Unchurched Next Door, 99–100. 
17 The Greek πάθος can be translated as “experience,” “feeling,” or “passion.” See Robinson and House, Analytical 
Lexicon of New Testament Greek, 259. 
18 See Craig, Reasonable Faith, 20–21.  
19 All the examples and research in the prior chapter on post hoc justifications support this claim.  
20 Heinrichs, Thank You for Arguing, 416. 
21 A great example of this is Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech. For more specific examples, see 




experiences. If a person were ostracized from their church due to their sexual orientation, why 
would they want to follow Christ? If an oppressed community’s abuse were justified through 
Christianity, why would they want to be a Christian? Deep, often undetectable, emotional pain 
affects people’s view of Christianity, whether directly or indirectly related to Christianity and the 
Church.22 If and when appropriate (kairos), the apologist can gently and respectfully try to 
address the pain and hurt, specifically after they have a positive relationship and the apologist is 
seen as trustworthy (ethos).23 Alongside the appeals above, addressing these experiential 
roadblocks can allow for a more serious consideration of Christianity.  
The fourth mode is kairos, persuasion by means of timing and appropriateness.24 The 
apologist, in this mode, seeks to selectively choose when to apply other means of persuasion. 
Certainly, there is an improper time and place for persuasive speech and argumentation. The 
Westboro Baptist Church, in a grotesque example of this, picketed a funeral of a homosexual 
teen who committed suicide while holding up signs that read “God hates fags.”25 There is 
wisdom in knowing when and how to present information. This echoes Jesus’ prompt to “be 
shrewd as serpents, and innocent as doves” (Matt. 10:6 ESV). Improper application and 
timeliness of persuasion methods reinforces held beliefs and hinders consideration of the 
 
22 On top of the demographic research from the previous chapter, another study shows that the people most resistant 
and antagonistic to the faith usually have intense emotional stories surrounding their dismissal, whether directly or 
indirectly. See Rainer, The Unchurched Next Door, 97–98. 
23 The apologist should be careful and patient. If not handled cautiously, this may have the opposite effect. Healing 
or re-framing experiential pain is usually not an easy or short process and may never even occur this side of 
paradise. More than not, this may simply mean listening or being a presence.  
24 The Greek καιρός can be translated as “fitting season,” “time,” or “opportunity.” See Robinson and House, 
Analytical Lexicon of New Testament Greek, 187. 
25 The Westboro Baptist Church is wrong in more ways than just their timing, but this method is clearly ineffective 




presented view.26 For example, in a formal debate at a university, logos should be the central and 
primary means of persuasion, whereas the overuse of pathos or ethos may be viewed as 
fallacious.27 Conversely, in an everyday conversation with a friend or child, over-reliance on 
logos is usually not necessary; sharing stories or testimonies (mythos) may be a better option. 
The fifth mode is mythos, persuasion by means of narrative and testimony.28 The apologist, 
in this mode, seeks to affirm, defend, and explain the faith through stories. This mode can be 
accomplished in several ways: fiction stories, allegories, myths, metaphors, parables, anecdotes, 
personal testimonies, stories of others’ experiences, and inviting people to re-frame their own 
story, among others. The editors of Futurist magazine once stated that the most valuable workers 
in the twenty-first century would be storytellers. It’s quite easy now to see why: humans are 
essentially narrative creatures, we make and are made by stories, they are fundamental to how 
we understand ourselves and the world around us.29 Similarly, the Christian faith was passed 
down and understood through stories. As Alister McGrath asserts, “we can not ‘demythologize’ 
Christianity, in that an irreducible narrative serves as both its heart and its backbone. Narrative 
acts as both the medium and the message in Christian apologetics.”30 Christians, then, have a 
unique place in culture, they have the ultimate story – not to mention a breadth of smaller stories 
– in their arsenal. Although apologists such as C.S. Lewis, J. R. R. Tolkien, Fyodor 
Dostoyevsky, and John Bunyan provide great examples of mythos, Jesus of Nazareth is actually 
 
26 Toren, Christian Apologetics as Cross-Cultural Dialogue, 184. 
27 In this type of setting, arguments from emotion and authority are fallacious as they alone do not lead to truth, as 
persuasive as it may be. Alongside logos, however, they may make the argument even more persuasive.  
28 The Greek μῦθος can be translated as “idle tale,” “fable,” or “story.” See Robinson and House, Analytical Lexicon 
of New Testament Greek, 240. 
29 This is largely supported by the research in the former chapter.  




one of the most prolific storytellers of the faith.31 Stories and parables are persuasive as they 
often have a way of circumventing more direct forms of communication; instead of abruptly 
stating an idea or proposition, a narrative entices the reader to engage and explore the topic with 
much greater nuance and attention, which explains how they are highly effective in changing 
ideas and affecting behaviors. Mythos also includes other uses, such as illustrating a point, 
suggesting solutions to a problem, planting ideas, bypassing resistance, and reframing or 
redefining problems.32 Even though stories have historically been closely aligned with 
apologetics, traditional apologetics often tends to dismiss narrative as a proper mode, likely due 
to the lingering influence of Enlightenment rationalism on evangelicalism and the preference for 
propositional revelation over the narrative genre.33  
The sixth mode is topos, persuasion by means of theme and relevance.34 The apologist, in 
this mode, seeks to show the faith as relevant and build a bridge from peoples’ lives to the 
gospel. Aristotle originally referred to topos as an audience’s common opinion, the place where 
any argument should begin.35 Topos, in literature, refers to a common theme that authors re-work 
to fit an audience.36 Together these more or less describe the idea: an apologetic method should 
be relevant to the audience. Both for clarity and effectiveness. This can be accomplished in 
 
31 For an excellent resource on mythos in Christian apologetics, see McGrath, Narrative Apologetics. 
32  Timothy Clinton and George Ohlschlager, Competent Christian Counseling, Volume One: Foundations and 
Practice of Compassionate Soul Care (Colorado Springs: WaterBrook Press, 2002), 376. 
33 For the effect of rationalism on narratives and evangelicalism, see Bebbington, “Evangelical Christianity and 
Modernism”; and McGrath, Narrative Apologetics, 12–15. 
34 The Greek τόπος can be translated as “a place” or “opportunity.” See Robinson and House, Analytical Lexicon of 
New Testament Greek, 343. 
35 See “commonplace” in Heinrichs, Thank You for Arguing, 419.  
36 For a biblical example of how a topos is used, see James R. McConnell Jr., The topos of Divine Testimony in 
Luke-Acts (Eugene: Pickwick Publications, 2014). Also see Terence Y. Mullins, “Topos as a New Testament Form,” 




multiple ways: using a common theme, story, or metaphor; explaining a concept in a way a 
person can understand; contextualizing the gospel message to the audience; utilizing means of 
persuasion that are most suitable to the person; and addressing the questions and needs a person 
finds relevant, among others. The failure of this mode often results in dismissal of the faith (and 
a poor missiology) since it is either incomprehensible or insignificant.37 A defense should be 
built from common ground (viz. common notions) between the apologist and the audience.38 
Inevitably, then, the approach will look different depending on the person or group.  
The seventh mode is tropos, persuasion by means of way and manner.39 The apologist, in 
this mode, seeks to persuade in a way concordant with Christ. As the Pauline literature 
emphasized in the previous chapter, the way an argument or appeal is made greatly matters. Any 
apologetic approach that humiliates, dehumanizes, coerces, or leads to violence is misguided.40 
Glen Scorgie explains this unloving manner of defending the faith: 
“If we offend someone by our aggressive tone, we are likely to say, like the raspy old 
mobster Don Corleone in the classic Godfather movies, after unleashing violence and 
murder on his enemies, ‘It’s not personal; it’s just business’... [It is] a hard-nosed, in-
your-face determination to dismantle the positions of unbelievers, expose their illogical 
 
37 This is evident when extended to the global scene. For example, in twentieth century Africa, the main theological 
questions raised relate to identity: how the belief of their ancestors and what it means to be African relates to the 
Christian God and what it means to be Christian. Traditional apologetic methods often fail to answer the apologetic 
questions of Contemporary Africa. Traditional approaches seem awkward and out of place. In many ways, this is 
simultaneously happening even in the Western world, specifically in postmodern settings. See Toren, Christian 
Apologetics as Cross-Cultural Dialogue, 3–4. 
38 The prior chapter revealed this was the strategy of Paul. For further arguments on why common ground is 
necessary, and why the critiques of thinkers such as Barth and Van Til are flawed or irrelevant, see Toren, Christian 
Apologetics as Cross-Cultural Dialogue, 190–195. 
39 The Greek τρόπος can be translated as “manner,” “way,” or “manner of life.” See Robinson and House, Analytical 
Lexicon of New Testament Greek, 350. 
40 Glen Scorgie shares a personal story where apologetics led to this outcome, see Glen G. Scorgie, “Confrontational 




or untenable nature, and ensure that truth triumphs. It is relatively indifferent to who 
gets run over or coerced—who gets shamed or humiliated—in the process.”41 
 
The how, not just the what, of apologetics should be carefully considered. The above reveals a 
possibility of when “winning an argument” becomes the ultimate apologetic goal instead of 
people following and becoming more like Christ. All apologetic methods and appeals should be 
loving and emulate the fruit of the Spirit (cf. Gal. 5:22-23, 1 Cor. 13:1-7) — especially in 
gentleness and kindness (cf. 1 Pet. 3:15; 2 Tim. 2:23-24). Speaking truth is not enough, it must 
be done in love (Eph. 4:15). Apologists should persuade in a manner that reflects God, the 
ultimate model of truth and love. Thomas Aquinas exemplifies this approach through his manner 
of discussing opposing ideas: fully understanding the others’ point of view, listening 
respectfully, abstaining from deceit in argumentation, refraining from jargon, and seeking clarity 
and charity.42 
The eighth mode is typos, persuasion by means of imitation and embodiment.43 The 
apologist, in this mode, seeks to defend the faith through embodying the gospel. The totality of a 
person’s life may be the best defense of the faith. Sadly, the opposite is true as well: failing to 
embody the gospel often pushes people away from the faith. As Gandhi once stated, “I would 
suggest first of all that all of you Christians, missionaries and all begin to live more like Jesus 
Christ.”44 Even though he appreciated and respected the teaching of Christ, he was disturbed by 
 
41 Scorgie, 25–27.  
42 This is Thomas Aquinas’s spirit of disputatio, which alongside his specific method of argumentation, comprised 
his method of disputation. Together these reflect the idea of truth and love. See Terry Muck, Christianity 
Encountering World Religions: The Practice of Mission in the Twenty-first Century (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2009), 118–124.  
43 The Greek τύπος can be translated as “type,” “image,” or “model.” See Robinson and House, Analytical Lexicon 
of New Testament Greek, 351. 




the actions of Christians. The Barna Group studied churchgoers to see if their attitudes and 
actions were more Christlike or pharisaical, and the results are sobering.45 Over half of the self-
described Christians were both pharisaical in attitude and action; only fourteen percent were 
Christlike in both attitude and action.46 The sad reality, especially evidenced through the 
attitudes towards Christianity in the previous chapter, is that people are pushed farther away 
from Christ from failure to imitate Christ. Imitating Christ’s love is a powerful means of 
persuasion that may overcome several different types of barriers. In several of the biblical 
passages from the last chapter, this was the general idea of a Christian defense: living in such a 
way, in word and deed, that people are drawn to the faith. If anything, this is a call to holiness — 
a holiness only made possible through God.  
The ninth mode is theos, persuasion by means of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.47 This 
mode emphasizes the role of God in persuasion. Christians would be amiss to believe it is solely 
themselves who are at work in the conversion and persuasion process. As Jesus announced, “No 
one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him” (Jn. 6:44 ESV). John Stackhouse 
Jr. describes the (in)effectiveness of human persuasion in conversion,  
“[Conversion] either in terms of fundamental redirection or in terms of full maturity 
cannot be accomplished by our own powers of persuasion... Therefore our human 
responsibility and opportunity is twofold. First, it is to bear witness, to demonstrate in 
our living and to articulate in our speaking the good news of new life under God’s 
 
45 Pharisaical attitudes included items such as “I believe we should stand against those who are opposed to Christian 
values” and “People who follow God’s rules are better than those who do not”; whereas Christlike attitudes included 
items such as “I see God-given value in every person, regardless of their past or present condition” and “I feel 
compassion for people who are not following God and doing immoral things”. For further information, see Barna, 
Churchless, 178–179. 
46 The remaining results reveal 21% were Christlike in attitude but pharisaical in action and 14% were pharisaical in 
attitude and Christlike in action.   





reign... Second, we are to offer all we can to help each other in moving toward the goal 
of full conversion, the goal of full maturity and everlasting shalom.”48 
 
Human persuasion and witness remain important, but God is the ultimate persuader. Long before 
an apologist arrives, God was already at work in persuasion. As the Body of Christ mediates 
Jesus’ presence on earth through the Spirit (typos), Christians are empowered to witness and 
defense. Yet God continuously draws people in, even without Christian presence. Ravi 
Zacharias, for example, explains how many people in the Middle East are still coming to Christ 
through dreams and visions despite the threat of death.49 An encounter with Christ is often all 
that is needed for a person to be ultimately persuaded (cf. Jn. 1:43-50; Ac. 9:1-30).  
Regardless of the breadth of persuasive tools at their disposal, apologetic methodologies 
tend to focus on only a select few modes. This presents two problems: (1) the utilized modes 
may not match the appropriate needs or roadblocks of a person or community, and (2) a failure to 
utilize a mode may actually lead to the opposite of the intended outcome. The apologist able to 
recognize the need for and utilize the appropriate mean(s) of persuasion, alongside God, will be 
the most effective in attacking the elephant. However, even then there is no guarantee of 
persuasion. Even when Jesus walked on Earth not all people were persuaded. Neither is there a 





48 Stackhouse Jr., Humble Apologetics, 81–83.  
49 For testimonies of this, see Tom Doyle and Greg Webster, Dreams and Visions: Is Jesus Awakening the Muslim 




Creativity over Rigidity: Foxes are the Future 
The Ancient Greek Poet Archilochus once said, "a fox knows many things, but a hedgehog one 
important thing." Over the years, this proverb has been utilized to differentiate people into foxes 
who craftily formulate various ideas into several strategies versus the unwavering hedgehogs 
who embrace a single idea/strategy and yield it masterfully.50 Stated differently, hedgehogs are 
rigid while foxes are creative. Creativity is “the tendency to generate or recognize ideas, 
alternatives, or possibilities that may be useful in solving problems, communicating with others, 
and entertaining ourselves and others.”51 On the contrary, rigidity resists adopting and changing 
to the circumstances. When applied to the field of apologetics, the fox and hedgehog can 
represent soft and hard apologists, respectively. Like the fox, soft apologists are eclectic and 
open to various methods; they are creative. Creativity, in this context, involves drawing and 
selecting from a wide array of apologetic strategies for specific audiences. Since persuasiveness 
is subjective to each individual, the application of apologetic arguments and strategies should be 
context-dependent and eclectic. Although apologists are often trained and practice as hedgehogs, 
the complex world is in desperate need of foxes. Even if individual apologists specialize in a 
certain method, strategy, or means of persuasion like the hedgehog, they should imitate the 
creative fox by adjusting their approach to their audience. If apologetics is about creative 
persuasion, then the defense of the faith should be very contextualized. 
This is not to say the specialized research and work of “hedgehogs” are bad — in fact, they 
are very needed. However, when the theory of apologetics is applied and practiced, a variety of 
 
50 For examples of this, see Isaiah Berlin’s essay “The Fox and the Hedgehog: An Essay on Tolstoy’s View of 
History” (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013) and Stephen Jay Gould’s The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the 
Magister's Pox: Mending the Gap Between Science and the Humanities (Easton: Harmony, 2003). 




methods are often useful and perhaps necessary.52 All three apologetic methodologies offer 
useful strategies in different situations, whether it be through logical arguments or sharing of 
stories. An effective apologetic approach should also share the aims of each apologetic method: 
demonstrating the rationality of Christian belief, that Christian belief is true, and that one ought 
to commit their life to Jesus. To match the context, apologists should adopt various parts of each 
apologetic method as they see fit. However, this should not lead to an uncritical amalgamation of 
the various views by forcing isolated and contradictory ideas into a larger system. Rather, they 
should be prepared to “attack” each locus of humanity the views uphold: person as thinker, 
believer, desirer; the head, the heart, and the gut. In any given circumstance, the apologist may 
need to recognize where a person’s resistance or “debris” is located. The debris could be 
intellectual, emotional, or instinctual. Most likely, a mixture is present. The creative apologist 
can choose a strategy which matches the context and “debris”.  
If apologetics is fundamentally about witnessing to others, and not solely about logical 
argumentation, then the apologist may take on a variety of forms or roles. At times, the apologist 
may look like a counselor, bringing healing while inquiring about the deeper roots of one’s belief 
and behavior; or friend, caring for and walking alongside another in their faith journey; or 
storyteller and performer, living out their faith life and telling stories – of their own life, of 
others’ lives, and of parables or great fiction stories; or coach, pushing for action instead of 
apathy or passivity; or teacher and debater, bringing clarity and coherency to systems while 
pointing out inconsistencies or deficiencies in others. Since apologetics is about people, and 
people are multifaceted, a proper apologetic approach, too, should be multifaceted.  
 




Overly rigid approaches are often ineffective at persuading a person and are even in danger 
of pushing people further away. For example, imagine a woman who suffered from paternal 
abuse as a child, and thus holds a subconscious distaste towards the “Father God” in Christianity. 
While talking to an apologist who tries to debate her lack of belief, the apologist offers several 
logical and rational arguments for the faith waiting for her to concede intellectually. Even if all 
the evidence the apologist shares leads to the likely conclusion of Christianity, the woman’s 
painful past is not dealt with, and she is perhaps worse off as she now associates Christians as 
forceful, controlling, and argumentative like her father. In another example, imagine a man who 
is critically searching for reasons to believe the faith is rational and logical, yet when he asks a 
Christian about their reasons for belief, they simply offer up their personal testimony and 
observance of miraculous healing services. Although these are not necessarily bad reasons, the 
man is left with the impression that Christians are blindly following their faith without rational 
evidence for it. If apologists lack the humility to believe that their method is not perfect in all (or 
most) situations, then their approach may yield unintended and harmful consequences — 
regardless of if the method sometimes works. For this reason, apologists who can draw from 
several strategies and wisely choose a fitting one are more likely to yield positive results in the 
practice of apologetics. Of course, every person will have their own strengths and weaknesses 
when it comes to creative persuasion, which becomes beneficial when apologetics is viewed as 
the role of the Church, and not solely the individual.  
 
Community over Individuality: It Takes a Village (of Geese) 
Geese fly farther together. When they fly in their iconic v-shape formation, the leader creates lift 




switching out leaders often to prevent fatigue. Even in the case where one bird falls ill and moves 
behind the pack, at least two other birds will fall back to support the one fallen behind. Similarly, 
African proverbial wisdom — in an acute critique against western individualism — avows that 
“it takes a village to raise a child.”53 The combined wisdom from the example of geese and the 
African proverb describes the importance of community and collaboration for growth and 
effectiveness. Together, these two summarize, more or less, the importance of community in 
apologetics: people are meant to be and grow within community, and the apologetic endeavor 
becomes wholly more effective through collaboration. Even though community is regarded as 
valuable, oftentimes the communal aspect is lost or disparaged in practice, especially, as will be 
argued below, at the expense of apologetics. As with all the dichotomies in this chapter, the latter 
is subsumed by the former; individuality is re-situated, but not neglected, within a framework of 
community.  
As implicated from the previous chapter, apologetics is the task of the Church. Even though 
the Church includes both communities and persons, emphasis is primarily given to individuals in 
apologetic approaches. Most of the apologetic literature highlights individualistic methods, viz. 
persona contra persona, where the method is for an individual conversing with another 
individual, or at the very least an individual to a passive audience, such as through debate or 
narrative means. Although these hold much value, they neglect the rich possibilities of a 
community-oriented approach. The counter-emphasis on community here is not to degrade 
individualistic approaches — in fact they are essential — but rather to re-situate them into a 
 
53 Although the exact origin of this phrase is unknown, several African proverbs reflect the spirit of this saying. At 
the very least, the saying reflects the “Africanist Perspective” according to Humanities professor Dr. Neal Lester in 
an interview with NPR. See Joel Goldberg, “It Takes A Village To Determine The Origins Of An African Proverb,” 





larger framework; instead of apologetics being the task of several separate individuals, rather, it 
is the task of a community of interconnected persons. In order to explain the difference, 
individuals and persons will be differentiated.  
Individualism, here, refers to the theory of a person as a self-contained entity, a project that 
attempts to reduce a person into what they are solely in themselves.54 Most apologetic training 
emphasizes the individual, this self-contained entity. The unspoken goal of this training, 
thoroughly exaggerated, is often to become a type of omniscient conduit of perfect reason or 
persuasion for the faith; the perfect debater or communicator, so to speak. However, the 
individualism project is doomed to fail, at least according to the research in the previous chapter. 
A person is not a self-contained entity. There is no person without other persons. A person is 
both a social and narratival being that cannot be reduced to what is essentially “themself.” What 
is a person without their relationships or memories with others? If these were suddenly forgotten, 
would you still be you? The obvious answer is the negative. There is no individual, a person 
outside of community or other persons. To use a trinitarian analogy, you cannot reduce the Holy 
Spirit to “itself” without the divine communion with the Father and the Son; heresy aside, the 
Holy Spirit would cease to be the Holy Spirit. So, too, with humans.  
So what of all this, then? How does this relate to apologetics? In two ways: 
anthropologically, the person being witnessed to is full of social and narratival connections that 
must be taken into account, same as the apologist; pragmatically, the work of apologetics is most 
effectively done within community through collaboration. The individualism model neglects 
these insights, it essentially views the task of apologetics as done by separate individuals. In 
 
54 Individualism in this context is not to be confused with other uses of the word, such as uses that come up in 




other words, it is as if there are several geese flying separately, only loosely connected by flying 
in the same sky and occasionally pairing up. A community-oriented model, which refines and 
reframes the former, views the task of apologetics as done by a community of several 
interconnected persons. The whole formation is based on community and collaboration, like 
geese. It may be appropriate, then, to speak of an “apologetic community,” which is essentially 
the Body of Christ, the Church. Everyone participates in this approach — regardless of 
education, (dis)ability, class, and so on — everyone is a witness to and defender of the faith in 
their own way. As there are many churches making up the Church, so are there many smaller 
apologetic communities. Many may find this distinction to be splitting hairs, a small and 
insignificant nuance, yet the consequences can be drastic. At the very least, the efficacy of the 
apologetic task is threatened. When the apologetic community is realized, the fruit of 
collaboration reaps many benefits. Like geese, the apologetic community can go further 
together.  
The most obvious benefit of community is a plurality of approaches and strengths. The 
previous section on creativity noted how the apologist’s role can take a variety of forms, such as 
teacher, friend, or storyteller, and although not every apologist will be gifted in all of these areas, 
an apologetic community allows others to “fill in the gaps” or to cover each other’s weaknesses. 
Personally, I have met many Christians who shy away from apologetics due to feelings of 
inadequacy; mainly as a response to traditional apologetics, where a certain intelligence and/or 
education to reason for the faith seems like the primary task.55 The same can likewise apply to 
 
55 Many adherents of traditional apologetics try to make resources accessible to those without the privilege of 
education or training, yet it is still focused on defense through intellectual reasoning. Disability theology poses a 
lethal critique to many un-nuanced forms of apologetics, where a “lack of” or difference in intelligence makes their 




E/N methods when communication skills are lacking. The separate personalities within the 
apologetic community is a strength, here, rather than a hindrance. The method(s) most persuasive 
for a person are far more likely to be covered in community; whereas an individual apologist 
leaves open many gaps. More so, as people are (re)introduced to the faith, they often require 
more than one encounter with people before being truly persuaded. An apologetic community is 
more likely to lead to multiple encounters.  
Similarly, an apologetic community will also reach a wider and more diverse audience. 
Obviously a single individual cannot be everywhere, know everything, do everything, and be 
everything needed for every person, despite how often some try; a community, however, gets 
much closer to those goals. When fatigue sets in, others in the community can take over. There is 
no dependence upon a single leader or small group. The whole is bigger than the sum of its parts. 
An apologetic community can pool resources, knowledge, and connections to tackle bigger and 
more diverse projects than what individuals can usually do, which tends to result in a greater 
impact. Whether the “debris” keeping people from the faith is intellectual, physical, emotional, 
environmental, or so on, a community is more apt to respond to it. Unfortunately, stories of 
people feeling “left behind” from Christian communities are very common. If a “community” is 
simply a loose patchwork of individuals in close proximity, rather than a unified and 
collaborating community, they will likely be unable to recognize and respond to people’s needs 
in several instances. When each individual has only their own goals and mission, many will 
predictably fall behind without assistance.  
Another downside of individualistic apologetic approaches is that frequently a particular 
strand of Christian theological tradition is put forward and defended, not simply the “essentials” 




This may lead some to believe that debatable matters are necessary to follow Christ, as many 
non-Christians (and Christians alike) are oblivious to the vast history and breadth of Christianity. 
This may be especially pronounced in traditions with a tight theological framework, where 
removal of one aspect leads the rest to fall apart, which is likely why particulars are especially 
defended in the first place. Yet, there are many who cannot accept certain practices or views of 
God, but would feel comfortable within a different tradition or theological strand; of course, they 
may never learn of that if they only converse with a single individual. An apologetic community 
can stymie the preoccupation with unessential doctrines and practices, specific traditions or 
denominations, and even individual leaders or thinkers so that people do not reject the whole 
instead of a part. Although some may see diversity of opinion as a negative, a diverse community 
can actually lead towards greater clarity and nearness to truth; perhaps even the humility and 
openness needed for genuine dialogue. 
The significance of community-oriented apologetics is more than just an attestation to 
teamwork — even though the effects of collaboration should never be underestimated. 
Apologetics is the task of the Church, the Apologetic Community. The call to witness to and 
defend the faith is the call for all persons, and since we are created as social beings, we 
necessarily fulfill this call in community. To be human is to be in community, to have relations, 
and stories, and memories, and if our apologetic strategies fail to account for this, our efficacy 
will inevitably be reduced. Rather than solely relying upon individualistic methods, such as one-
on-one conversations or an individual writing a persuasive book for the faith, a revised 
apologetic framework should incorporate those methods within a model of community and 
collaboration. This revised framework should challenge the focus on the singular; not only 




“What can we each do together?”. Individualistic apologetic approaches are vital, but they 
cannot supplant the ontology of the Church as the Apologetic Community.  
 
Summary & Conclusion 
If apologetic methods are necessarily affected by their anthropological assumptions (and an 
exploration of contemporary apologetic methods seems to suggest so), and if a person-as-desirer 
model proves the most accurate (and the current interdisciplinary research certainly serves as 
corroboration), then an effective and well-informed apologetic method will develop from the 
implications of such a model. Apart from many of the insights already discussed from soft E/N 
methodologies, three particular implications of the research are valuable for the development of 
an apologetic method: persuasion over argumentation, creativity over rigidity, and community 
over individuality. The conclusion of human persons as holistic suggests persuasion through 
multiple means for effectiveness in defending the faith. Creativity, as the art of persuasion, 
indicates the polyvalent role of the apologist. The task of defending the faith is not fulfilled by a 
few select individuals but is consummated through and practiced as the Apologetic Community. 
Although this chapter may be criticized for its focus on theory and method rather than more 
specific and “practical” guides or how-tos, it accurately portrays the essence of such a method. 
There is no one-size-fits all approach. Every person’s needs are different and require a unique 
strategy. Each community will need to work out in their time and place how to best respond to 





This thesis has attempted to derive insights on apologetic method from research on what it means 
to be human. I have sought to accomplish this in three steps. The first main chapter explored 
contemporary apologetic methods. Around fifteen unique approaches were found through 
comparing several taxonomies of apologetic methods. Although some were not considered for 
further consideration due the scope of this thesis, the rest were placed into three categories based 
on their similarities: Traditional Apologetics, Presuppositionalism, and Experiential/Narratival 
Apologetics. The approaches of each were analyzed and their underlying assumptions of 
humanity explored. These reflected James K.A. Smith’s taxonomy of anthropological models 
and each correlated to a different primary apologetic aim: persons as thinkers, with the aim of 
demonstrating the rationality of the faith; persons as believers, with the aim of showing 
Christianity to be true; and persons as desirers, showing that one ought to commit their life to 
Christ.  
The following chapter examined interdisciplinary anthropological research for 
comparison to the assumptions of each method. Theological anthropology — explored mainly 
through the early Genesis narratives, Christology, and Pauline literature — revealed intimations 
of the person-as-desirer model through the human condition, nature, purpose and mission, 
salvation, and telos, among others. The sciences corroborated similar claims. The sociological, 
psychological, and economical research thoroughly rejected a person-as-thinker model, and 
revealed humans as at least believers, if not desirers. However, any ambiguity was dismissed 
promptly due to the neuroscientific research that substantially supported a person-as-desirer 




insights already gleaned from E/N methodologies, three implications of the research for 
apologetics were provided: (1) apologetics is (and should be) about more than simply logical and 
rational arguments, (2) apologetics should take a creative approach, and (3) apologetics is the 
task of the Church, not just individuals. 
The implications from the previous chapter were rewritten in three dichotomies: 
persuasion over argumentation, creativity over rigidity, and community over individuality. 
Rather than focusing on only logical or rational arguments or evidences, the first section 
discussed nine unique modes of persuasion for defending the faith: (1) logos, persuasion by 
means of logic and coherency; (2) ethos, persuasion by means of character and authority; (3) 
pathos, persuasion by means of emotions and values; (4) kairos, persuasion by means of timing 
and appropriateness; (5) mythos, persuasion by means of narrative and testimony; (6) topos, 
persuasion by means of theme and relevance; (7) tropos, persuasion by means of way and 
manner; (8) typos, persuasion by means of imitation and embodiment; and (9) theos, persuasion 
by means of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The following section on creativity emphasized the 
eclectic nature of a well-informed apologetic method. The final section on community described 
the importance of collaboration in apologetics, the role of community in each person’s life, and 
developed the idea of an Apologetic Community.  
The arrival to an apologetic method such as this may seem foreign, if not foolish, to 
many, as it is very different than the concept of apologetics they have been handed. Perhaps this 
is the point all along: apologetics has become a branch that needs to be pruned, made less 
exclusive, individualistic, and overly cognitive, and more in line with how we were made and 
how we are. Although each apologetic method could filter Derek’s story through their own lens 




this method is not only more effective in a pragmatic sense, but more in line with who people 
essentially are and the kind of work we are called to as Christians — the Apologetic Community.  
A few future lines of inquiry come to mind. First, an examination of a wider scope of 
apologetic methodologies, such as historical or unpopular methods, may prove fruitful. Although 
this would not change the outcome of the interdisciplinary research, it may help further nuance 
the assumed anthropological models and track the history of development and shifts in 
methodology and/or anthropology. Second, since pentecostalism is my received and chosen 
tradition, this research could lead to further development and articulation of a distinctly 
pentecostal apologetic method, with a special emphasis on pneumatology that was noticeably 
absent in this paper. Lastly, little attention was given to a philosophy of language, which can not 





1 Although omitted due to space restraints, I found the work of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy especially valuable. His 
insight on language or speech as related to community, narrative, affections, embodiment, and logic reflects much of 
the heart of this work. Furthermore, his discussion of grammatical health and “diseases” of speech are timely for the 
current climate of apologetic dialogue today. See Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, The Origin of Speech (Eugene: Wipf 
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